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PAY FOR REGULATOR PERFORMANCE
M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung*

Few doubt that executive compensation arrangements encouraged the excessive risk taking by banks that led to the recent
Financial Crisis. Accordingly, academics and lawmakers have
called for the reform of banker pay practices. In this Article, we
argue that regulator pay is to blame as well, and that fixing it may
be easier and more effective than reforming banker pay. Regulatory failures during the Financial Crisis resulted at least in part
from a lack of sufficient incentives for examiners to act aggressively to prevent excessive risk. Bank regulators are rarely paid for
performance, and in atypical cases involving performance bonus
programs, the bonuses have been allocated in highly inefficient
ways. We propose that regulators, specifically bank examiners, be
compensated with a debt-heavy mix of phantom bank equity and
debt, as well as a separate bonus linked to the timing of the decision to shut down a bank. Our pay-for-performance approach for
regulators would help reduce the incidence of future regulatory
failures.
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Why did the [regulatory] system fool itself?†
I. INTRODUCTION
Conventional wisdom holds that executive compensation
practices helped precipitate the Great Financial Crisis. As a result,
pay reform has been a central focus for policymakers and scholars.1 We agree that pay practices likely contributed to the Crisis,
but the problems were not confined to Wall Street bankers’ pay.
The pay of Wall Street regulators is to blame as well. Myriad tales
of regulatory inertia preceding the Crisis strongly suggest that
regulators simply had insufficient incentive to act aggressively in
the face of banks’ excessive risk taking. We propose a solution—
performance pay for bank regulators.
Some note that banker pay may have been too highpowered—too focused on shareholder value and insufficiently sensitive to potential losses, which would ultimately be borne by taxpayers.2 We assert that bank regulators’ pay is not high-powered
enough and therefore, ironically, also insufficiently sensitive to
potential losses to taxpayers. Currently, regulators’ pay is not in
any way linked to performance. Bank regulators are civil servants
paid a fixed salary that does not depend on whether their actions
improve banks’ performance, protect banks from failure, or in-

†

Ellen Seidman, former head of the Office of Thrift Supervision.
See Dodd-FrankWall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1376 , 1964 (2010). See also Sanjai Bhagat &
Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L. J. 247 (2010); Patrick
Bolton, et al., Executive Compensation and Risk Taking, FRB of New York
Staff Report No. 456 (June 2010); Rudiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. Stulz, Bank
CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 1 J. FIN. ECON. __ (2010); Frederick
Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for
Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2011); Frederick Tung and
Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Global Financial
Crisis, Working Paper (2011).
2
Taxpayers bear the ultimate responsibility for failed banks, either from explicit insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or implicit insurance seen in the bailout of Citigroup, Bear Stearns, AIG, and other
financial institutions. See infra Part III.B.2
1
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crease social welfare.3
In this Article, we show how bureaucratic pay for bank
regulators can lead to suboptimal regulatory action, and we propose incentive pay as a solution. Specifically, we propose that in
addition to salary, bank examiners should receive incentive pay
based on changes in the value of the debt and equity securities of
the banks they regulate,4 as well as a bonus related to the timing of
the decision to shut down a bank. Giving examiners a stake in bank
performance, both upside and downside, will create better incentives to promote optimal regulations, to intervene where necessary
to reduce bank risk taking, and to innovate to improve regulatory
efficiency. If incentives are well calibrated, examiners can capture
some of the benefits that accrue from making banks more valuable,
while suffering as well some of the negative consequences when
banks fail.
While the idea of incentive pay could be generalized to
higher-level bank regulators (and incentive pay may be needed
there as well),5 for logistical reasons,6 our specific proposal centers
on bank examiners. For each of the largest banks, one or more
permanent examiners are assigned to supervise the bank as their
full-time job. They have offices and support staff at the bank, and
they spend a good part of their working lives as a regular presence
at the bank they supervise. This permanent examiner and the large
bank she supervises are our focus.7 Examiner incentive pay should
3

See Part ___, infra.
As described below, see infra note __, we propose that examiners be paid
with “phantom” securities—cash payments based on the market performance of
their regulated banks’ stock and debt securities—instead of actual securities of
their banks. This approach avoids potential insider trading issues and the specter
of government control of banks.
5
See infra Part VI.F (discussing the possible application of our proposal to
higher-level regulators).
6
The major logistical hurdle for applying our proposal to higher-level regulators is that unlike permanent examiners, these regulators typically oversee
multiple banks. Holding a portfolio of debt and equity securities of multiple
banks may create perverse incentives for the regulator. For example, she may be
tempted to favor the most promising bank over others, instead of minding the
safety and soundness of each bank. See id.
7
Insofar as authority to supervise, control bank conduct, and impose regulatory sanctions rests elsewhere, either as a matter of course or for a particular
bank, then incentives should be placed there as well. We discuss this in the con4

(continued next page)
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be calibrated based on the performance of the regulated bank’s
debt and equity securities,8 as well as the shutdown bonus mentioned earlier.
There may be ways to extend the approach to higher-level
regulators. Given the novelty of our proposal, however, we are
content to advocate primarily for focused experimentation with
bank examiners. More powerfully incentivized bank examiners
may also reduce the need for market-based incentives at higher
levels. Incentivized bank examiners could be expected to push
more aggressively against a suboptimal status quo than examiners
not so incentivized.10
Our proposal offers a partial remedy for some widely recognized infirmities that routinely plague the administration of
regulatory systems. These include capture, indifference or slack, a
lack of creativity or innovation, a selection bias in who takes government jobs, and a mismatch between skills and regulatory assignments. We believe incentives for regulators could go a long
way toward improving regulatory efficiency without upsetting too
much the current civil service system or the culture of public service at bank regulatory agencies.
In the absence of high-powered incentives, it is assumed
that those individuals who self-select into regulatory jobs will
text of the bank shutdown decision. See infra Part V.C. Where there is more
than one senior-level examiner, it might make sense to have incentive compensation for each examiner above a certain level, just as many high-tech firms
award stock options widely among employees, or it might be more sensible to
have only one examiner so compensated. In general, we leave it to agency heads
to decide the overall scope for the implementation of performance pay. See infra
Part ˛III.A.
8
More precisely, the equity securities we rely on are the publicly traded equity securities of the bank holding company parent of the bank. Almost every
large bank is held as a wholly owned subsidiary of a bank holding company. See
infra Part V.B.3.
10
Our focus on examiners also requires that we limit the scope of our proposal to the period before and including the decision to shut down a bank. Admittedly, important decisions are made after the shutdown decision that affect
bank creditor recoveries and the amount of losses left with taxpayers. Because
banks’ securities are typically worthless once banks fail, however, and because
examiners play little or no role in the conduct of the receiverships that resolve
failed banks’ assets and liabilities, our proposal’s scope is necessarily limited to
the period before and including shutdown.
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value public service, and will do the work of aligning performance
with desired social welfare outcomes. But this proxy is obviously
not perfect: some will choose government jobs because the job
demands may be less severe than in the private sector; some may
value public service but not in ways consistent with social welfare
maximizing regulation; and some who would be great regulators
may be put off by the lack of incentives and absolute levels of pay.
There is undoubtedly some variation across regulators. Given this
and the seniority-based system of low-powered incentives, even
those regulators with the best motives and skills would not necessarily rise to the top. This approach may not be the optimal way to
motivate regulators, and, in fact, we present strong evidence that it
is suboptimal.
We do not dismiss the value of attracting regulators imbued
with a desire for public service. We are mindful of the risk that financial incentives might crowd out regulators’ public-spirited motivations toward conscientious regulation: Putting a price on diligence might encourage some regulators to slack.11 At the same
time, however, regulators’ dismal performance in the Crisis makes
us skeptical that public-spirited motivations are sufficient incentive. At scores of banks, examiners and other regulators were well
aware of operational deficiencies and excessive risk taking several
years before those banks failed.12 But regulators stood still in the
face of this information. They utterly failed to demand corrective
action by banks. Instead, examiners continued to rate these risky
institutions as “fundamentally sound.” Washington Mutual, the
largest bank failure in U.S. history at the time of its failure, enjoyed a “fundamentally sound” rating until six days before its collapse.13 Defending regulators’ existing incentive structure seems
quite problematic after the Crisis.
We propose to improve regulators’ incentives by adding or
subtracting pay based on an algorithm designed to better track the
social welfare interest in bank regulation. By paying regulators
with a mix of securities reflecting the full range of a bank’s bal11

See infra Part VI.A.1.
In the three years before Washington Mutual Bank failed, examiners
spent over 100,000 hours over 400 days inspecting its assets and operations. See
infra note 75 and accompanying text.
13
See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
12
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ance sheet, our proposal incentivizes regulators toward striking a
socially optimal balance between increasing bank values and credit
and reducing the costs of bank failure. This could mean more or
less regulation, depending on the bank and the circumstances. For
instance, examiners who gain from increases in bank values (by
holding phantom bank stock) may take steps to make the examination process more efficient, to get the amount and type of disclosures right, and to encourage valuable lending and risk taking.14
Examiners holding (phantom) bank debt may pursue a more interventionist approach in some cases, since they bear some of the
losses arising from the socially inefficient risk that exists on their
watch. Regulators incentivized to worry about losses to taxpayers
may be more diligent in their supervision of bank assets and management, may be more aggressive in assuring that corrective recommendations are implemented, may encourage or require
changes to bank balance sheets, and so on. The mix of debt and
equity securities will be key to achieving the appropriate types and
levels of examiner activity.
In any event, the role of the regulator would subtlety
change from being antagonistic to being cooperative, since the examiner shares in the bank’s gains and losses. Just this change in
orientation could have profound effects on the nature of bank regulation. An added benefit is that our approach incentivizes examiners to marshal the private information they learn on the job to not
only improve their own compensation but to reveal it to the market, albeit indirectly, by taking action when necessary to curb excessive risk taking at the bank. The market will be fooled less often
because of examiners’ incentive to act promptly when signs of
trouble arise.
Pay reforms to date have focused on the regulated, not the
regulators. The so-called pay czar, Kenneth Feinberg, enjoyed
wide authority to dictate pay at banks receiving emergency funding
under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).15 The Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)
adopted several reform proposals targeting banker pay. For exam14

The debt component of this incentive pay helps to ensure that risk taking
internalizes the expected social costs of insurance.
15
Aaron Lucchetti, David Enrich & Joann S. Lublin, Fed Hits Banks with
Sweeping Pay Limits, WALL ST. J. A1 (Oct. 23, 2009).
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ple, “say on pay” provisions require banks (along with other public
companies) to conduct regular advisory shareholder votes on executive pay.16
Academics have proposed other approaches as well. For instance, Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann argue that bankers
should be paid not just with equity but with a slice of the entire
capital structure of their bank holding company in order to better
internalize the actual costs of corporate decisions on various
stakeholders.17 One of us has argued elsewhere that a better approach would be to pay bankers with subordinated debt of their
banks.18 These academic proposals intend to link banker pay more
closely with the social welfare outcomes expected from banking
activity levels and risks.
Our approach has a similar goal, though regulators would
have a greater focus on avoiding losses under our approach than
CEOs would have under these academic proposals. The reason is
straightforward: CEOs should be focused mostly on creating individual firm value, while regulators should be mostly focused on
minimizing risk. In other words, CEOs have control of the accelerator, while regulators man the brake. While the optimal pay
package for CEOs should contain a bit of brake, as we explain below, the optimal pay package for regulators should include a bit of
accelerator.
Though the reform of regulator pay and bank CEO pay are
not mutually exclusive, our proposed regulator pay reform offers
three potentially significant advantages over proposed banker pay
reforms. First, it is easier for government to change its own behavior and policies than to try to alter the pay practices of private en-

16

See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat.
1376 , 1964 (2010). In addition, banks must disclose incentive-based compensation tied to financial outcomes and must adopt a three-year claw-back policy in
the event of a subsequent financial restatement that suggests incentive payments
should not have been made. Id. at _. The policy must require return of incentive
payments that would not have been awarded under the restated financial statements. The penalty for noncompliance is delisting. Interestingly, only the regulated parties suffer the claw-back possibility; regulators, who also received bonuses during the inflation of the housing and finance bubble, get to keep theirs.
17
See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1 at 1.
18
See Tung, supra note 1.
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terprises.19 Resistance to the pay reforms proposed by the pay czar
for a very limited number of TARP companies exemplifies the difficulties that banker pay reform proposals will face. Although
some regulators might not be happy with our approach, we know
of no reason why the president or agency heads could not implement it without much trouble. With external regulation, as opposed
to internal governance incentives for bank CEOs, regulators would
still have to cajole or coerce banks in order to effect regulatory policy. We view this as the more promising strategy, however, given
the demonstrated political resistance to government tinkering with
executive pay.
Second, bank CEOs might be able to end run around any
requirement to hold debt by simply contracting with third parties to
unwind their debt incentives.20 As long as the monitoring and enforcement of bank CEOs’ portfolio requirements are imperfect, the
optimal compensation contract will not be achieved.21 By placing
the risk brake firmly in the regulator’s hands (instead of or in addition to the CEO’s), this enables adjustments to bank risk policy no
matter how the CEO’s incentives are structured.
Third, the potential error costs from miscalibrating pay requirements will be lower with regulator pay reforms. Agency
heads presumably have better information about their own employees and agency than they have about banks. They can therefore be expected to make fewer mistakes when setting compensation policies for their own employees than for bank CEOs. Course
corrections will also be easier to implement as needed.
We do not view our project as a search for perfect regulatory incentives. Instead, we believe that incorporating incentivebased pay as one component of regulators’ compensation works an
improvement over current practice. Conceptually, the claim is deceptively modest: pay should be linked with performance, in government as it is in the private sector. The key is finding metrics for
measuring “good” and “bad” performance in government, and de19

See id. at __ (discussing implementation hurdles for banker pay reforms).
For example, a put option on the CEO’s debt holdings would effectively
enable the CEO to transfer the debt risk to the option writer.
21
End runs by regulators are likely to be more difficult, since regulators are
already subject to conflict-of-interest rules, which could be adapted to prohibit
hedging strategies that neutralize their incentive arrangements.
20
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ploying them in ways that will not make things worse. Fortunately,
as we show below, reasonable metrics exist in banking regulation,
making this a good test case for a more general commitment to pay
for regulatory performance. As has been the case with executive
pay, we fully expect there will be learning over time as the inevitable problem arises with our proposal. But much has already been
learned from the trials and errors in designing executive compensation, so that implementation of our proposal would hopefully avoid
some obvious pitfalls of incentive compensation.
While we leave it to agency heads to develop optimal compensation practices over time, we believe even small steps in the
direction of our proposal could have large effects on the efficiency
of banking regulation. The need to incentivize regulators is especially important after Dodd-Frank, whose say-on-pay provision is
likely to generate even higher-powered incentives for managers to
maximize shareholders’ private interests. High-powered bank CEO
incentives require a corresponding impetus for regulators to proactively constrain bank risk taking.
To make our case, we proceed as follows. Part II offers
background and context for our incentive pay proposal for regulators. In Part III, we describe the current incentive model for banking regulators, its failure in the Financial Crisis, and theoretical
criticisms of this model. In Part IV, we elaborate the theoretical
case for paying banking regulators according to their performance.
We also define what good and bad performance looks like, tying
these to objective metrics that can be used to design pay systems.
Part V then describes in more detail what exactly a pay-forperformance contract might look like for a bank examiner, including a discussion of the mix of consideration types that could be
used. In Part VI, we offer some qualifications and address some
limitations to our proposal. Part VII concludes.
II. REGULATORS’ PAY AND ITS DISCONTENTS
This Part sets the context for our reform proposal. It recounts early discussion of the possibility of incentive pay for government officials, as well as recent innovations in regulator pay.
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A Short History of Performance Pay
for Regulators

We are not the first to point out the problems with the standard pay structure for bureaucrats. Four decades ago, Gary Becker
and George Stigler published their seminal article arguing for incentive pay in law enforcement.22 Others extended the argument,
developing various economic models demonstrating the potential
efficiency gains from introducing market-based incentives in the
compensation of government officials.23 Susan Rose-Ackerman
authored an important contribution in support of this idea, noting
that regulators need to be both competent and motivated. She
pointed out how economic incentives could do important work in
providing motivation. Importantly, she explored the delicate tradeoffs implicated by the deployment of market-based incentives in
bureaucratic environments.24
Unfortunately, these academic insights have found no purchase among policymakers: forty years later, bureaucrats are still
paid like bureaucrats. The timing of these articles (roughly 1974 to
1986) was probably inauspicious: during this period, CEOs were
paid like bureaucrats too! It was not until four years after RoseAckerman’s proposal that Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy published their path-breaking article in the Harvard Business Review
arguing for incentive pay for CEOs.25 Summarizing pay practices
of publicly traded companies at the time, they concluded that “corporate America pays its most important leaders like bureaucrats,”
22

Gary Becker & George Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1974).
23
See, e.g., Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Some Results on Incentive Contracts with Applications to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and
Law Enforcement, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 20 (1978). A related question is whether
and how best to hold public actors, like the police, school officials, and other
bureaucrats liable for constitutional violations. After all, holding someone liable
ex post for bad conduct is similar to adjusting their pay ex ante to pay only for
good conduct. For a comparison between the public and private approaches to
this problem, see M. Todd Henderson, Qualified Immunity for Corporate Directors, Working Paper.
24
See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Reforming Public Bureaucracy through
Economic Incentives?, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 131 (1986).
25
See Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s
Not How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV. (May/June 1990).
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instead of owners. They advocated for a dramatic increase in the
use of stock option compensation.26 Unlike the academic proposals
on incentivizing government actors, the Jensen and Murphy article
triggered a decades-long process of fundamental change in the
structure of executive pay. Although some gripe at imperfections
in current executive compensation practices,27 no one doubts that
CEOs now have greater incentives to act in the interests of shareholders than they did before the advent of incentive compensation.
We propose to apply that learning to the regulatory context
to improve regulator performance. Giving the regulator a mediumto long-term stake in the value of the regulated entity may encourage regulatory decisions that improve social welfare. The key is to
ensure that regulator pay properly accounts for the social component of banking risk. In fact, the banker pay reforms discussed
above have traction because they propose a social welfare component for banker pay. These lessons can be applied to regulator pay
as well.
B.

Toward Regulator Pay for Performance

Our regulatory incentive compensation proposal borrows
not only from the neglected economics literature of the past. It also
finds hope in changed pay practices for government officials implemented in the last few years. The Obama administration has
dramatically increased regulators’ salaries. According to public
records, the number of federal government officials earning sixfigure salaries has skyrocketed. In the Department of Transportation, for example, only one DOT employee earned a salary exceeding $170,000 at the start of the recession. Eighteen months later,
that number had ballooned to 1,690 employees. The number of civilian employees in the Defense Department earning $150,000 or
26

Id.
To be sure, there are problems with current pay practices in the private sector, but the consensus view is that the linkage between pay and performance has been a hugely valuable change for social welfare. Even the strongest
critics object to the implementation rather than the theory. See, e.g., LUCIAN A.
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
27
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more jumped from 1,868 in December 2007 to 10,100 in the succeeding eighteen months.28
A plausible impetus for this trend is the belief that greater
pay will bring better talent. Here, the federal government is simply
following the model that other governments have used. Most famously, Singapore has used large pay increases to improve the
quality of its regulators.29 While such pay increases may be important in attracting talented people, paying more does not by itself
generate optimal incentives. If it did, the problem of CEO pay
identified by Jensen and Murphy would not have existed. CEOs
were highly paid in 1990; they were just not paid for doing the
things their principals would want them to do.
Bank regulatory agencies have begun using bonuses ostensibly tied to performance. During the period 2003 to 2006, three
bank regulators – the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC), Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the Office of the
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) – paid out nearly $20 million in
retention and performance bonuses to bank examiners and other
regulators.30 In 2006 alone, the FDIC gave bonuses to 2000 bank
examiners.31
There are, however, several shortcomings to this very modest move toward pay for regulator performance. First, although $20
million seems like a lot of money, across three years, three agencies, and thousands of regulators, most of the bonuses were likely
quite small and unlikely to provide much incentive to dramatically
change behavior.32 Second, the use of ex post bonuses, even if
28

See http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-12-10-federal-paysalaries_N.htm.
29
Top ministers paid $1.3 million in 2007. Paid 2/3 of median of top 8 professionals
in
several
top
fields.
See
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/world/asia/09iht-sing.3.5200498.html.
30
See Matt Apuzzo, “Government Bank Regulators Got Big Bonuses,” ASSOC.
PRESS,
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/18/government-bank-regulatorbonus_n_503712.html.
31
Id.
32
Exact individual figures are not available. Although one examiner was
reported to have received a bonus of about $40,000 on a salary of about
$180,000, the large number of recipients means the average bonus per year was
likely more on the order of a few thousand dollars. See id.

DRAFT AUGUST 24, 2011

12

HENDERSON AND TUNG

tightly linked with performance, may not yield incentives as highpowered as with other techniques, such as the mix of equity, debt,
and bonuses that we propose. At the time Jensen and Murphy
wrote, CEOs routinely received cash bonuses, and yet pay and performance were not as tightly linked as when stock and stock options came into use. Ex post bonuses do not generate as much accountability as ex ante incentive contracts tied to outside metrics.
To the extent that ex post bonus payments are discretionary, they
allow for the intrusion of non-performance based criteria, such as
favoritism, political affiliation, and so on. The linkage between bonuses and conduct that maximizes social welfare may therefore be
tenuous.33 To be sure, there is a tradeoff between accountability
and the ex ante costs of designing and implementing transparent
incentive structures. As explained below, however, banking regulation may be an area where the objective elements of good and bad
performance make the ex ante design costs small relative to the
potential efficiency gains. Finally, bonuses are likely to be one
sided–that is, paid in good times but not recouped in bad times.
This is likely to bias regulation in a particular direction.34
In the next Part, we consider how these pay practices and a
lack of high-powered incentives for regulators may have contributed to regulatory failure in the Financial Crisis.

33

A recent audit of the SEC by the OIG shows the general nature of the
problem. See “Audit of SEC’s Employee Recognition Program and Recruitment,
Relocation, and Retention Incentives,” Office of Inspector General, Office of
Audits,
Aug.
2,
2001,
available
at
http://www.secoig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2011/492.pdf. The report details numerous
flaws in the agency’s current compensation practices. For instance, the SEC paid
a bonus to an employee who “who played a key role in the investigation that
failed to uncover Bernard Madoff’s massive long-running Ponzi scheme.” See
BNA, “OIG Audit Spurs Changes to Plan For Employee Recognition, Recruitment,” [cite needed].
34
Claw-back rules for regulators similar to the Dodd-Frank provision would
be one way of reducing this bias.
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III. REGULATORS’ PAY AND THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS
There is widespread agreement that regulators failed to act
aggressively enough during the Financial Crisis. As detailed below, the problem was not one primarily of access to information,
lack of expertise, or resource constraints. Reports on bank failures
by various inspectors general reach the same conclusion: regulators
did a satisfactory job of identifying problems well in advance of
failure, but failed to act aggressively enough to remedy the indentified problems.35 The problem, in our view, was incentives. Regulators did not have the right incentives to turn their recommendations
into actual reforms of bank policies.
Bank examiners are paid a fixed salary and have very stable
employment. Although their mission is to avoid losses to the federal deposit insurance fund, they are not paid based on this metric.
In addition, with pay delinked from an objective performance metric, regulators may naturally focus on bureaucratic tasks with observable outcomes, rather than on more aggressive and costly actions with more complex and less transparent cause and effect relationships. If a bank fails, there are multiple causes to which blame
can be assigned. But there is only the examiner to blame if reports
are not accurately completed and done well. Under existing incentives, examiners might naturally conclude that their job is well
done simply by accurately describing problems and bringing them
to the attention of management and senior regulators They have no
stake in doing more. Doing less, by contrast, means less work, less

35

See, e.g., Report of the Office of Inspector General, Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, March 2009, “Material Loss Review of Silver State
Bank, Henderson, Nevada,” (“Silver State Report”) (“[A]lthough the FDIC identified SSB’s loan concentrations and funding sources as potential high-risk areas
of concern in examinations completed as early as 2005, the FDIC took limited
actions to mitigate the bank’s aggregate level of risk exposure.”). The same phenomenon occurred during the S&L Crisis of the 1980s. See FDIC Report, “An
Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s,” (“FDIC Report”) available at www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/421_476.pdf at 24
(“[T]he analysis in this chapter shows that for most failed banks that had had
recent examinations, ratings generally did a satisfactory job of identification
well in advance of failure.”).
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hassle, less political pushback, and less risk, all for the same wage
and career results.
To see how this problem manifest during the Financial Crisis and how pay for performance might have solved some of the
problems, we describe what bank regulators do and what they did
wrong during the Financial Crisis.
A.

What Bank Regulators Do

This section offers a thumbnail sketch of the basics of dayto-day bank regulation, since the individuals doing this work –
bank examiners – are the focus of our proposed compensation reforms.
1.

The Bank Examination Process

Several federal agencies supervise banks: the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) supervises national banks; the
Federal Reserve (Fed) supervises state member banks and bank
holding companies, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company
(FDIC) supervises state non-member banks and FDIC-insured savings banks.36 Although the rules, regulations, and approaches of
the various agencies differ, the basic approach is relatively uniform. Regulators assess the safety and soundness of banks through
annual examinations of bank assets and operations. A senior bank
examiner (the “examiner in charge” or “EIC”) leads an examination team, which varies in size and composition based on the size
and complexity of the regulated bank.37 Importantly, the senior

36

See FDIC Report, supra note 35 at 463. The FDIC also has back-up supervisory responsibility for monitoring the condition of national banks and state
member banks, and in fulfilling these responsibilities it works with the other two
federal regulatory agencies. Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), it also has back-up authority to examine thrift institutions as well. State banking departments supervise statechartered banks. Id.
37
The resources can be quite extensive. For example, the equivalent of 20
full-time employees were involved in the supervision of WaMu. See also FDIC
Report, supra note 35 at 464.
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bank examiner leading the team is delegated tremendous authority
over the examination and the regulated bank.38
There are several levels of hierarchy in the typical bank
regulatory agency. At the OCC, for example, EICs for large banks
are overseen by Deputy Controllers for Large Bank Supervision
(DLCBS). A DCLBS “[e]valuates and approves the EIC’s recommendations, including regulatory ratings and risk assessments”
and “[a]pproves the supervisory strategy for each bank.”39
The examination typically occurs once per year.40 The
process lasts from weeks to months, depending on the size and
complexity of the bank, its assets, and operations. The supervision
of Washington Mutual (WaMu), one of the larger supervised banks
under the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), included annual examinations from 2003 to 2008 averaging about 200 days. Reported
hourly work data show that the equivalent of 20 full-time examin38

Bank examiners responsible: “This examiner has full responsibility for
supervision of the entire examination process.” Id. at 463.
39
Id at 10-11. DCLBSs are part of the OCC Supervisory Office, which
comprises higher-level regulators that oversee EICs. The Assistant Deputy
Comptroller at OCC oversees the supervision of a portfolio of small or mediumsized banks. The ADC has authority to “ensur[e] that the banks address supervisory concerns, follow plans for corrective action, meet reporting requirements,
and respond properly to enforcement actions.” See Comptroller of the Currency,
“Bank Supervision Process: Comptroller’s Handbook,” (Sept. 2007) at 9-10.
Although this seems like the locus of supervisory power for bank examinations,
it may not be the case. As described in the text, line examiners have significant
discretion in evaluating credit and management, and there is little an ADC can
do if the examiner’s judgments in her analysis and reports do not reflect the actual risk at the bank.
40
The frequency of examination varies by agency and over time. For instance, the National Bank Act of 1864 mandated that the OCC examine all national banks twice a year but allowed an extension to three examinations every
two years. This policy stood until 1974, when the OCC moved toward off-site
examinations using statistical methods, and the average examination schedule
was more like 18 months. With the passage of the FDICIA, on-site examinations
were required by law. By the late 1980s, resident examiners were placed in the
largest multinational banks, and by the 1990s, larger regional banks also got
resident examiners. See FDIC report. Similar changes were also true of FDIC
and Treasury examinations. FDIC examination periods varied from one to three
years, depending on the CAMELS rating of the bank in question. Like for the
OCC, however, the FDICIA mandated “annual on-site examinations of all banks
except highly rated small institutions, for which the interval could be extended
to 18 months.” FDIC Report at __.
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ers or assistants of various kinds was devoted to supervising this
one bank.41
The examination process has two broad goals: review of
the quality of bank assets, with special focus on the bank’s most
important assets, its loans; and analysis of the bank’s financial
condition and the quality of its management and operations.42
Throughout this multistage process,43 the lead bank examiner has
wide discretion as to the volume of loans reviewed, the nature of
the examination, the time spent on each analysis, and the consequences of the examination results.
The power of bank examiners is seen in the details of the
examination process. Examiners make local judgments about the
credit quality of each asset. These assets are then discussed with
loan officers and bank managers. Examiners then make final determinations (effectively unreviewable) about how to classify particular loans for input into a final supervisory rating.44 Examiners
also review loan portfolios as a whole for issues such as concentration risk, violations of legal rules, and deviations from bank loan
and underwriting policies. In addition, examiners assess the adequacy of capital and reserves, sensitivities to liquidity and interest
rate shocks, the activities of insiders, the behavior and impact of
subsidiaries and affiliates, risks from litigation, and the costs and
benefits of off-balance-sheet activities.
All of these fact-based judgments go into determining the
bank’s CAMELS rating, which is the single metric used by regulators to capture safety and soundness. Examiners rate banks on a
scale of 1 (good) to 5 (bad) in each of six areas – Capital adequacy,
Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to

41

See Dept. of Treasury, Offices of Inspector General, “Evaluation of Federal Regulatory Oversight of Washington Mutual Bank,” Report No. EVAL-10002, Apr. 2010 (“WaMu Report”).
42
FDIC Report, supra note 35 at 464.
43
There are four stages of a typical examination: (1) off-site analysis; (2)
on-site examination; (3) preparation and approval of an official report; and (4)
use of informal or formal administrative actions designed to solve any problems
or reduce losses to the insurance system. FDIC Report, supra note 35 at 463.
44
The examiner will either “pass” a credit or assign it to one of the following categories: (1) special mention, (2) substandard, (3) doubtful, or (4) loss. See
id.
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market risk – and then assign a composite score.45 A score of 1
means a bank is performing far above average; 2, the most common score, means “fundamentally sound”; 3 means “some degree
of supervisory concern”; 4 means generally unsafe and unsound
conditions; and 5 means severe problems and likely failure within
one year.46
Once the on-site review is done, the examiner presents the
findings to bank management, who are given opportunities to make
comments, dispute findings, and commit to remedying any deficiencies. Finally, the report is taken to the board of directors, outside of the presence of management. Directors are given a chance
to express their views individually and as a group. To the extent
problems have been identified, examiners are usually looking for
commitments from individuals or the entire board to strengthen the
bank’s condition by taking corrective actions.
Importantly, it is only when the bank has deteriorated significantly, say to CAMELS rating 4 or 5, that regulatory higherups would be involved in the meetings with the board of directors.
To get a sense of how rare this might be, WaMu kept its overall
CAMELS rating of 2 until September 19, 2008; it failed six days
later.47
The overall goal of on-site review is to “identify the risk of
failure in troubled institutions in sufficient time for supervisors to
take corrective action.”48 Recent bank failures discussed below illustrate that examinations may fail woefully in this pursuit. The
other tool available to examiners is a follow-up enforcement action, which is designed to “control the risk-taking behavior of
problem banks after they have been identified.”49 This action may
be necessary because once the bank finds itself in peril, managers
and shareholders have less to lose from high-risk strategies. They
have incentives to engage in speculative lending or other high-risk
45

All scores are reported, so a typical rating would look like this: 22122/2.

See id.
46

See OTS Examination Handbook, Section 070, pages 070A.3 & .4.
See WaMu Report, supra note 43 at 18; Robin Sidel, et al., “WaMu is
Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, In Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History,
WALL
S T.
J.,
Sept.
26,
2008,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122238415586576687.html.
48
FDIC Report, supra note 35 at 439.
49
WaMu Report, supra note 43 at __.
47
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strategies, which reward shareholders if successful, but place
losses primarily with creditors or the government if unsuccessful.50
Follow-up enforcement therefore offers a sensible regulatory tool.
Unfortunately, regulators failed here as well.51
2.

Regulators’ Power over Banks

Regulators have tremendous power to influence bank decision making. Much of the actual power resides with bank examiners. For example, the decision to drop a bank’s CAMELS rating
from 2 to 3 (moving the bank from “fundamentally sound” to indicating “some degree of supervisory concern”) is largely if not entirely within the discretion of the bank examiner. The examiner
accompanies this downgrade with informal actions, which include
obtaining a written commitment to take corrective action.52
When things deteriorate to a CAMELS rating of 4 or 5, as
earlier noted, higher-level regulators typically become involved,
taking formal legal actions that are enforceable in the courts.53 Although ultimate authority to enforce legal sanctions and modifications to bank activity resides at administrative levels above the
50

FDIC Report, supra note 35 at 439. This of course is the classic asset
substitution problem for creditors.
51
See infra Part III.C.2.
52
This written commitment commonly comes in the form of a board resolution creating a Memorandum of Understanding between the bank and the regulator. See FDIC Report, supra note 35 at ___.
53
See id. at 441. These include mandatory asset sales, sales of new equity or
debt, cease-and-desist orders, suspension or removal of officers and directors,
and civil penalties. Id at 441-42. Section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act
is exemplary of the powers given to bank examiners in this area. It gives the
FDIC board broad formal enforcement powers to terminate FDIC insurance protection; (8(a)) to issue cease and desist orders; (8(b)) and to remove or suspend
individual officers or directors. (8(e)) The FDIC has delegated many of these
powers to the regional or examiner level. Some triggers are automatic. For instance, FDIC policy requires formal action pursuant to section 8 when an insured state nonmember bank falls to a CAMELS rating of 4 or 5. Historically,
many formal actions were taken pursuant to section 8 and other laws, such as the
Prompt Corrective Action rules. See id at __, Table 12.6. From 1980 to 1995,
nearly 2400 formal actions were taken. Most were cease-and-desist orders under
section 8(b) (1485 of these), termination of insurance under section 8(a) (394 of
these), and removal of officers or directors under section 8(e) (369 of these). See
id.
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bank examiner, even in that situation, examiners wield enormous
influence because they control the inputs into this decision making
process. Since increased monitoring or regulatory intervention requires examiners to identify problems and pursue initial ratings
downgrades, effective incentives for examiners to act are necessary
for optimal regulation. Examiner passivity, by contrast, effectively
insulates a troubled bank from higher-level scrutiny and corrective
sanctions.
Given examiners’ crucial gatekeeper role, as a practical
matter, they enjoy effective power to improve capital, levy fines,
remove management, restrict dividends and other inappropriate
funds transfers, and restrict riskier lending and excess asset
growth.
Not only do bank examiners and regulators have tremendous authority over a range of bank decisions, but they control the
scope and intensity of the regulatory process as well. Regulators
enjoy enormous discretion over critical decisions in the supervisory process.54 They have wide latitude to decide, among other
things, the amount of resources to devote to a particular examination;55 how often to conduct examinations; whether to conduct onsite or off-site examinations; whether to focus on large or risky
banks or large or risk assets within a given bank; how to weight
particular geographic concentrations of banks or assets;56 how to

54

Consider the decision whether to shut down a failing bank, for example.
Statutes generally limit shutdown to “insolvent” banks. But the definition of
insolvency is left to the discretion of the regulator. A report on bank failures
noted that the OCC “had wide latitude to define insolvency and could have
adopted a more flexible standard than it did . . . .” FDIC Report, supra note __ at
457.
55
“From 1979 through 1984 both the FDIC and the OCC reduced their examiner resources: the FDIC’s field examination staff declined 19 percent, from
1,713 to 1,389, and the OCC’s declined 20 percent, from 2,151 to 1,722. The
Federal Reserve’s examination capacity remained almost unchanged. FDIC Report, supra note 35 at 17.
56
Geographic concentration of losses was true in both the S&L Crisis and
the recent Financial Crisis. During the S&L Crisis, about 75 percent of all bank
and thrift failings were in Texas and Oklahoma. See FDIC Report at 456. For a
more complete discussion of the issue of examination frequency in Texas and
the Southwest during the 1980s, see O!Keefe, THE TEXAS BANKING CRISIS,1"14. During the recent Financial Crisis, loan losses in California, Florida,
(continued next page)
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extrapolate from past performance to predict future performance of
banks, assets, or particular asset classes; and how and how often to
share information with other government agencies and the market.57 Although some of these are not under the control of individual examiners, examiners may at the very least influence how these
issues are decided.
B.

Regulatory Failure in the Financial Crisis

This section discusses the nature of regulatory failure in the
Financial Crisis. It first offers a broad overview based on postmortem reports by the inspectors general of the various bank regulatory agencies. It then examines two emblematic bank failures
during the Financial Crisis in order to highlight the impact that
regulators’ compensation structure may have had.
1.

Anatomy of a Regulatory Failure

The reports of inspectors general of the Treasury Department conclude that regulators did not do enough to prevent multiple banks from taking excessive risk and failing. Although acute
funding constraints were a precipitating factor for many bank failures, the reports do not conclude this shock was sufficient to explain bank failures. One report explains: “Although the deterioration in the bank’s financial condition was severe in 2008, the underlying risks were evident in the preceding years.”58 The consensus seems to be that if regulators were more aggressive, hundreds
of billions in losses could have been avoided.
In general, regulatory failures fell into two broad but discrete categories that correspond to the supervisory functions. Supervision is designed (1) to recognize problems before they become significant, so that actions to return the bank to a sound financial footing can be achieved at reasonable cost, and (2) to limit
Nevada, and several other states account for the bulk of the original losses that
led to downgrades of mortgage-backed securities. See [cite needed].
57
Bank chartering authorities also have the power to appoint a conservator
or receiver, and the FDIC has the power to terminate or suspend deposit insurance.
58
Silver State Bank Report, supra note 35 at 31.
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losses to the government insurance funds by “closely monitoring
troubled institutions, limiting their incentives to take excessive
risks, and ensuring their prompt closure when they become insolvent or when their capital falls below some critical level.”59
The first category is the failure to adequately inspect and
supervise bank risk taking during “good” times, that is, periods
without financial stress. We might think of this as a failure to do
adequate preventive medicine. The failure reports describe many
instances in which the regulators did not meet even the basic obligations to understand bank risk taking, ensure compliance with basic risk policies, and restrict certain types of risk taking. For instance, regarding the failure of IndyMac in 2008, the inspector
general of the Treasury Department concluded: “examiners did not
identify or sufficiently address the core weaknesses that ultimately
caused the thrift to fail until it was too late."60 As noted above,
problems often resulted from the failure to deploy regulatory tools
as banks took increasingly large and risky positions.
The second category is the failure to react to signs of distress and intervene quickly enough to prevent further damage. The
post-mortem on the $2.5 billion collapse of NetBank is typical of
this type of regulatory failure. According to the Treasury Department inspector general, the Office of Thrift Supervision “did not
react in a timely and forceful manner to certain repeated indications of problems."61 A similar lapse preceded the $2 billion failure
of ANB Financial. The regulator – the Office of the Comptroller of
Currency – “did not issue a formal enforcement action in a timely
59

FDIC Report, supra note 35 at ___.
See Office of Inspector General, Department of the Treasury, Audit Report, Safety and Soundness: Material Loss Review of IndyMac Bank, Feb. 26,
2009, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/13059311/Indymac-Bank-ThriftFinancial-Report. The summary of the regulators’ actions in the more than $2
billion failure of ANB Financial National Association is typical: "OCC . . . was
not aggressive enough in the supervision of ANB in light of the bank's rapid
growth." OIG reports also noted the failure of bank examiners and officials in
the nearly $1 billion failure of Omni National bank ("OCC's supervision of
Omni National Bank was inadequate," Treasury investigators concluded); the
nearly $2 billion collapse of New Frontier Bank (“In retrospect, a stronger supervisory response at earlier examinations may have been prudent," FDIC's inspector general concluded); and dozens more.
61
See Apuzzo, “Government Bank Regulators Got Big Bonuses,” supra
note 30 .
60
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manner” after the bank began to suffer losses and experience distress.62
The general sense one gets from reading the failure reports
is that the regulators engaged in more box-checking and paper
work than aggressive oversight. For instance, WaMu’s regulator
did not “formally track the status of examiner recommendations
and [required] corrective actions.”63 Bank examiners did the important work of assessing bank assets and risk. They saw deficiencies and recommended changes, but then never followed up to see
if these changes were being made. This same phenomenon recurred with shocking frequency in the recent bank failures.64 A
typical report concluded:
We found that bank management did not effectively
implement key examiner recommendations over
several examination cycles regarding such controls
as loan-to-value limits, interest reserve policies,
stress testing and establishing meaningful concentration limits, and maintenance of a sufficient [allowance for losses] and adequate capital structure.65
(emphasis added).
A more in-depth examination of two failures offers context
for our incentive pay proposal.
2.

Silver State Bank

Silver State Bank was a Nevada bank regulated by the
FDIC. Like many banks, it grew rapidly during the housing boom
of the 2000s, betting heavily on residential and commercial real
estate, especially in and around Las Vegas. When the bank failed
in 2008, it cost the taxpayers about $550 million, as well as obliterating over $20 million in uninsured deposits.66
62

Id.
WaMu Report, supra note 43.
64
Silver State Bank Report, supra note 35 at __.
65
Id at 30.
66
See Jake Bernstein and A.C. Thompson, “The Small Bank Bust,” PROPUBLICA, Jan. 26, 2009, available at http://www.propublica.org/article/the63

(continued next page)
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Regulators knew the risks Silver State was taking and the
fragility of its financial position for at least six years prior to its
failure. Examiners knew of problems with Silver State’s board of
directors and management as early as January 2002, and continued
to report on them consistently through June 2008. Though examiners repeatedly raised issues about the soundness of the bank’s
business model, they “did not assertively address examination
findings that were repeated areas of concern.”67
The supervisory problem was not a lack of understanding
but of action: “[W]hen needed, a more progressively stringent supervisory tone was not presented in the [reports of examinations],
and actions were not taken.”68 More specifically, although “the
FDIC identified [the bank’s] loan concentrations and funding
sources as potential high-risk areas of concern in examinations
completed as early as 2005, the FDIC took limited actions to mitigate the bank’s aggregate level of risk exposure.”69
This inertia manifested most obviously in the CAMELS
rating, the key driver of informal and formal regulatory action. Despite the fact that examiner reports expressed significant misgivings about the bank’s safety and soundness, the CAMELS rating
remained a 2 (“fundamentally sound”) until May 2007, when the
bank was on the verge of complete failure. While noting that examiners failed along many dimensions of data collection and
analysis,70 the inspector general concluded that the bank collapsed
not because examiners did not know about the problems,71 but besmall-bank-bust-090126.
67
Silver State Bank Report, supra note 35 at __.
68
“Nonetheless, our view remains that DSC could have exercised greater
supervisory concern in the 2007 and prior examinations regarding SSB’s management, asset quality and liquidity and taken additional action to address both
the conditions and risks in these areas.” Id at __.
69
Id at __.
70
See id at ___ (noting that examiners failed “to recognize and/or analyze
risk, set a proper tone in the [examination reports]; appropriately consider risk in
CAMELS ratings; ensure that proper controls and risk limitation and/or mitigation strategies were established and appropriately implemented; identify in a
timely manner [the bank’] increasing risk profile, including concentrations in
targeted market areas, as a potential concern; and deal assertively with bank
management on examination findings and recommendations.”).
71
The examiner’s reports recommended numerous improvements and corrective actions: It “recommended that bank management improve its measuring,
(continued next page)
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cause they did too little to prevent them from growing. Examiners
did not follow through and hold the bank to account for the failures
and shortcomings identified.
The report does not offer compelling reasons why regulators would choose to be so diligent in diagnosis but relatively inattentive when it came to treatment. But it echoes a common theme
with other failure reports: Examiners devoted far more attention
and resources to figuring out what was wrong with banks than trying to fix them.72
3.

Washington Mutual

The failure of WaMu tells a similar story. WaMu was the
largest financial institution supervised by the Office of Thrift Supervision.73 Right before it failed in 2008, WaMu had over 40,000
employees working in over 2000 branch offices, servicing nearly
$200 billion in deposits and over $125 billion in residential loans.
In the years before its failure, WaMu refashioned its business
model to pursue higher risk. Management decided to shift away
from originating plain-vanilla mortgages (fixed rate, conforming
loans) to higher-yield subprime loans.74 When the housing bubble
burst, this decision proved fateful, as it resulted in WaMu’s collapse.
The problems at WaMu were not unknown to bank examiners in the years leading up to its collapse. In the three years before its failure, examiners spent over 100,000 hours over 400 days
monitoring, and reporting of concentrations; internal routines and controls; loan
underwriting and administration; . . . compliance with the FDIC’s Rules and
Regulations . . . improve the monitoring and reporting of its economic environment and the policies and procedures covering interest reserve loans.” See id at
__.
72
Although some doctors, like the fictional Dr. House on the eponymous
Fox television program, undoubtedly diagnosis patients only for the fun of solving the puzzle, for almost all patients, the diagnosis is only relevant to treatment.
As we discuss in the next section, examiners were paid mostly for diagnosis, and
if healers are not paid to treat as well, there will be less treatment than if they
are.
73
At the time, banks effectively chose their regulators and paid regulators
assessment revenue. From 2003 to 2008, WaMu represented 12 to 15 percent of
OTS’s total assessment revenue. WaMu Report, supra note 43 at 16-17.
74
Id at 8.

DRAFT AUGUST 24, 2011

2011]

PAY FOR REGULATOR PERFORMANCE

25

pouring over WaMu’s assets and operations.75 As early as 2003,
bank examiners had reported significant deficiencies in WaMu’s
underwriting process for residential loans, its core loan activity.76
Specifically, examiners noted that organizational controls were
weak and that the sales culture was aggressively focused on building market share at the expense of quality and process. Over the
next several years, examiners repeatedly criticized WaMu for its
underwriting practices and overly risky incentive structures.77 Examiners made nearly 1000 formal criticisms and recommendations
during this period. However, they did not follow up to assure that
problems were remedied. They brought no enforcement actions
against WaMu, despite the fact that the problems persisted and
worsened.78 Crucially, many of these deficiencies were in core underwriting functions, which the OTS examination handbook describes as vital to safety and soundness of banks: the “first defense
against excessive credit risk is the initial credit-granting process.”79
Asset quality is the other essential component of safety and
soundness. Here too examiners raised numerous issues but took no
action. Examiners “repeatedly identified issues and weaknesses
associated with WaMu’s asset quality,” but “[n]evertheless . . .
consistently assessed WaMu’s asset quality as satisfactory, with a
rating of 2 until [WaMu failed].”80
The most likely explanation for the regulatory forbearance
was the fact that during the period in question (2004 to 2006),
WaMu appeared to be profitable. When asked by the inspector
general why they did not act in the face of these numerous deficiencies, examiners responded, “even though underwriting and risk
management practices were less than satisfactory, WaMu was
making money and loans were performing [and] [a]ccordingly, the
examiners thought it would have been difficult to lower WaMu’s
asset quality rating.”81

75

See id at __, Table 5.
See id at ___.
77
See id at __.
78
See id at19-20, Table 7.
79
Id at 21-22.
80
Id at __.
81
Id at __.
76
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Although one might normally commend the humility of
regulators in the face of market indicators, such a defense is flatly
inconsistent with the nature of the government’s role as an insurer
of bank risk. Moreover, it contravenes explicit regulatory policy,
which instructs examiners against taking comfort in loan and market performance in the face of underwriting or concentration risks.
If a bank “has a high exposure to credit risk, it is not sufficient to
demonstrate that the loans are profitable or that the association has
not experienced significant losses in the near term.”82 As in the
case of underwriting standards, the inspector general found it puzzling that examiners did not downgrade WaMu’s CAMELS rating
in the face of these longstanding shortcomings.83
The WaMu examination process was emblematic of the
regulatory failures of the Financial Crisis. As with the failure of
Silver State Bank, IndyMac, and countless others, the report criticizes examiners for not acting preventively, not tracking the implementation of corrective measures, and relying solely on persuasion and future threats instead of formal action. 87
C.

A Public Choice Account

In this section, we offer an answer to the questions raised
by the WaMu report: Why would examiners, who repeatedly identified problem areas, continue to rate WaMu so highly in the face
of such obvious shortcomings in its business model and practices?
Why did examiners err so egregiously on the side of noninterven-

82

Id at __.
Given this specific guidance, the significance of single family residential
lending to WaMu’s business, and the OTS’s repeated warnings on asset quality
that WaMu management seemingly ignored, it is difficult to understand how
examiners could allow WaMu a satisfactory asset quality 2-rating for so long.
Assigning a satisfactory rating to unsatisfactory conditions sends a mixed and
inappropriate supervisory message to the institution and its board, and is contrary to the very purpose for the CAMELS rating system.
87
See id. at __ (“OTS’s supervision did not adequately ensure that WaMu
corrected those problems early enough to prevent a failure of the institution.
Furthermore, OTS largely relied on a WaMu system to track the thrift’s progress
in implementing corrective actions on hundreds of OTS examination findings.”).
83
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tion, in the face of specific policy guidance to the contrary? The
answer is incentives.84
1.

Pay for Bureaucratic Performance

Like everyone else, bank examiners maximize according to
the incentive structure in which they find themselves. Bank examiners are paid almost entirely in fixed salary that varies primarily
by seniority. Examiners also cannot easily be terminated. They enjoy the special job security fashioned by the civil service rules.
This employment arrangement may encourage examiners to perform the observable aspects of their charge carefully and conscientiously—like conducting the bank examination and filling out the
required reports. But examiners may have insufficient incentive to
pursue the less observable or more discretionary aspects of their
charge with the same enthusiasm.
Job security for examiners may make some sense. With
their fixed salaries, if examiners could be terminated for poor performance, they might be extremely risk averse. For example, if a
bank failure on an examiner’s watch significantly increased her
risk of termination, the regulator’s incentive would be to ensure
that the bank was not taking much risk. Though good for the regulator, the social cost from reduced credit availability and lost bank
profits might be quite high. Reduced job security might also subject examiners to political pressure for doing their jobs too well.
Regulated banks might be able to bring political pressure to bear
on conscientious regulators unwilling, say, to allow a failing bank
to continue operating or to permit a bank’s excessive risk taking.85
84

Another potential story of failure is that regulators were under-resourced.
But this is difficult to square with the facts. Although the amount of resources
devoted to examinations undoubtedly played a role in the failure of banks during
the Financial Crisis, the numerous failure reports suggest the problem was as
much one of incentives as it was hours devoted. For instance, the OIG report
about WaMu’s demise describes the resources the OTS devoted to supervision.
Over a six-year period leading up WaMu’s failure, OTS examiners spent over
160,000 hours (about 27,000 per year on average) working exclusively on supervision of WaMu. See WaMu Report, supra note 43, at 17, Table 5. Examinations averaged about 150 days in length and were conducted by the equivalent of
20 full-time employees. See id at __ (based on the data in Table 6).
85
Cite Keating Five.
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Job security reduces counterproductive risk aversion and
the risk of political capture. It gives examiners discretion in applying regulation, perhaps in ways that improve social welfare. But
without additional incentives, the civil service rules may also create perverse incentives by insulating regulators too well from the
consequences of their job performance. So insulated, some may be
encouraged to exert low effort or avoid courses of action likely to
make more work for themselves. Job and salary security reduce
incentives to do “good” work, however defined, since the consequences of “bad” work are reduced.
2.

Bureaucratic Incentives

In a simple model, examiners will act when the expected
personal benefits of their actions exceed the expected costs. With a
fixed salary independent of performance and a remote chance of
termination, it is not surprising that examiners are not aggressive
and that they focus more on observable process than outcomes.
Performing the examination and filling out examination reports is
entirely within the examiners’ control. This output is subject to objective performance metrics (e.g., is the report completed on time
and in a competent manner?). Without follow-up enforcement, the
reports are not likely to generate collateral costs for examiners,
such as political pushback, extra work for staff, and error costs.
In contrast, aggressive follow-up enforcement is likely to
raise the personal costs to examiners significantly with little or no
personal benefit. Costs rise simply because the work moves from
investigation to persuasion, both of higher-ups and the regulated
party, each of which may push back strongly. Examiners may also
fear making a mistake by restricting the lending of a seemingly
successful bank. This problem may be exacerbated by the fact that
examiners routinely work with the same bank for extended periods.
They often go to work every day at the bank they are examining.
While it is possible that familiarity breeds contempt, the opposite
effect, akin to the Stockholm syndrome, may also skew regulatory
decisions, especially where actions require confrontation. Collective action problems may also arise. Examiners or regulators who
chose not to do the extra work could free ride to some extent on the
more conscientious regulators, which reduces all regulators’ incentives to do the work in the first place. Examiners bear little or no
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risk from bank failure and gain little or nothing from bank success.
After all, others are involved in determining success or failure. In
the event of a failure, there is no shortage of other parties to blame.
By contrast, if a report is not completed or done well, only the examiner is to blame.
More generally, bank examiners and regulators are subject
to the same interest group pressures and incentives as other regulators. It is easier to please a concentrated interest at the expense of a
diffuse opposition than vice versa. Concentrated interests make life
difficult—they may sue, embarrass, and so forth—while diffuse
interests rarely raise a fuss. For example, according to media accounts, around 2006, federal regulators noticed banks were lowering underwriting standards and amassing large concentrations of
commercial and residential mortgage loans.86 Regulators issued
very mild warnings to reduce the concentration risk and raise capital to act as a cushion against losses. The response was aggressive:
Though far from a crackdown, even that mild guidance was too much for banks. Thousands of industry comments poured in objecting to the regulators'
intrusion, and the FDIC and other agencies backed
off, clarifying that they didn't intend to impose limits.87
Legal disputes may arise, and well-connected banks may be
able to exert pressure through the political process in the form of
budgetary restrictions for agencies or, worse, for individual examiners. Regulators interested in not appearing before congressional
committees, defending budgets, and being forced to testify in court
would likely err on the side of regulatory restraint, especially when
they do not capture the upside from aggressive regulation and do
not bear much of the downside cost of laxity.
Raw partisan politics might also influence regulatory decisions. The failure of Broadway Bank in Chicago is a recent example. Alexi Giannoulias was a former senior loan officer of the
bank, which his family controlled. The bank failed and entered
86
87

See Bernstein & Thompson, “The Small Bank Bust,” supra note 69 at __.
Id.

DRAFT AUGUST 24, 2011

30

HENDERSON AND TUNG

government receivership. At the time, Giannoulias was a candidate
for the United States Senate from Illinois. Ordinarily, regulators
issue a “material loss report” within six months of a bank’s failure
that estimates losses to government insurance funds. In this case,
however, regulators delayed issuing the report, which reflected
negatively on Giannoulias and his family, until after the election.88
There is also the revolving door problem. Some regulators
are bound to get some of their expected compensation from future
employment with regulated banks. Insofar as the value of future
employment (that is, being hired plus the amount of compensation)
depends on acting in the public interest as regulators, then this
form of deferred compensation might be a positive incentive for
regulators. In other words, if banks prefer to hire former examiners
with a good record in having helped banks avoid failure, then the
deferred compensation from the revolving door would act as a socially beneficial incentive. If, on the other hand, banks prefer former examiners who acted in ways desirable to banks but ambiguous as to the public interest, then this could be a negative force
pushing examiners to act in ways that banks but not the public
would desire. For instance, banks might prefer former examiners
who are knowledgeable, who know the loopholes and the weaknesses of the regulatory agencies, and who, above all, do not raise
a fuss. These traits might correspond with the kind of lax regulation described above, where regulators excelled at identifying
problems but failed miserably at doing anything about them. In any
event, there is no evidence that revolving door payouts are linked
to socially optimal conduct by regulators.
3.

Summary

If an individual is paid regardless of performance, then the
individual will likely maximize something other than performance.
This might be leisure or something else, but it is unlikely to be the
social welfare maximum. For instance, regulators might be envious
88

Ray Gibson, “Federal Report on Giannoulias Bank Will Come After
Election,” CHIC. TRIB. (Oct. 22, 2010), available at
http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2010/10/federal-report-ongiannoulias-bank-will-come-after-election.html
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of bankers, and therefore impose Draconian limitations on them, or
regulators might be sympathetic to bankers (either out of familiarity or a desire for future employment) and therefore behave permissively. One cannot be sure how these incentives cut in any
given case; behavior is likely to vary widely by individual and over
time.
Importantly, regulators would personally gain nearly nothing from pushing for additional oversight. The personal benefits to
the examiner of reducing bank failure are therefore smaller than
they would be if examiner compensation were linked with bank
performance. The clear incentive in the existing environment is
simply to perform the concrete tasks – like filing out forms and
making recommendations – as well as possible, and to disregard
implementation on the margin, since that is where costs are likely
to exceed benefits. After all, it takes a great effort to persuade a
bank to act more conservatively, while there is little gain to the examiner from doing so, in terms of either pay or prestige. To be
sure, some regulators would value doing the right thing and serving the public interest, but given the ambiguity of these terms and
the potential for rationalization, the absence of monetary or reputational rewards or sanctions means examiners care less than they
would in the presence of more high-powered incentives.
This is not to say that regulators were necessarily aware of
these biases and distortions of their conduct. A common refrain in
bank failure reports is the lack of awareness on the part of regulators. For instance, regarding IndyMac, which in 2008 became one
of the largest bank failures in history, "[Regulators] believed their
supervision was adequate. We disagree."89 We do not doubt the
honesty or good faith of the regulators who felt that they were doing the best they could do. We simply observe that regulators are
influenced in ways beyond their ken, just as we all are. They respond rationally to the incentives they face, and can rationalize
their conduct to fit to these incentives.
As earlier discussed, regulators apparently recognized some
need to improve individual incentives. Certain agencies adopted
bonus structures in the period before the Financial Crisis, but these
89

See Apuzzo, “Government Bank Regulators Got Big Bonuses,” supra
note 30.

DRAFT AUGUST 24, 2011

32

HENDERSON AND TUNG

one-sided bonus payments likely exacerbated the incentive problems instead of ameliorating them. As Ellen Seidman, the former
head of the OTS, noted, “regulators were part of the problem, and
the bonuses were a symptom.”90 Seidman attributed a large part of
the regulatory failure to a lack of “standards for evaluating how
well people in the regulatory system were doing” despite the fact
that regulators thought they were doing so well.
Perhaps regulators thought they were doing well because
they were maximizing to the best of their ability within their given
incentive structure. We turn now to our proposal to reform regulators’ incentives.
IV. INCENTIVIZING REGULATORS
Bank examiners were too slow in pursuing corrective action to address recognized problematic risk taking at their regulated banks. We propose to rely on market-based incentives to
avoid this regulatory regress.
Though our proposal may seem radical at first, we are not
the first to propose regulator bonuses or even to recognize that pay
increases may improve regulators’ performance. As earlier noted,
the Obama administration has aggressively increased regulators’
pay in selected areas, presumably to attract and retain excellent
employees. Bank examiners specifically have also received performance bonuses in the recent past.91 Our innovation is simply to
offer an unbiased, market-based approach to allocating bonuses.
In this Part, we first present a theoretical framework for
thinking about incentive pay for regulators. We then offer a mapping of our proposed incentive pay for regulators, together with
bank CEOs’ pay incentives, which illustrates that regulators’ pub90

Ellen Seidman, a research fellow at the New America Foundation think
tank and the former head of OTS from 1997 to 2001.
91
Even bank regulators think this is a good idea. See Apuzzo, “Government
Bank Regulators Got Big Bonuses,” supra note 30 (quoting thrift office
spokesman William Ruberry, “These [bonuses] are meant to motivate employees, have them work hard.”); (“In making compensation decisions, the OCC is
mindful of the need to recruit and retain the very best people, and our merit system is aimed at accomplishing that. . . . We also believe it is important to reward
those who worked so hard and showed such great professionalism throughout
the crisis.”).
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lic-regarding incentives should be calibrated to respond to the
structure of bank CEOs’ private performance incentives. Highpowered CEO performance incentives require high-powered regulator incentives. We next discuss incentive design issues: considerations in setting the level of regulators’ incentives and anticipated ancillary benefits from regulatory innovation.
A.

A Theory of Incentive Pay for Bank Regulators

The socially optimal course for banks is to track a course
that is profitable but does not create excessive default risk. Bankers’ equity-fueled incentives and the moral hazard created by government guarantees, however, may cause bankers to err on the side
of excessive risk taking.92 The regulator’s job is to curb this tendency.
Regulators act as agents of taxpayers in doing this work. As
described above, at-the-bank examiners have enormous discretion
in determining the outcome of bank supervision, and can therefore
be considered a locus of primary regulatory action, where incentives for optimal action are the most crucial.93 These incentives
could be achieved through a variety of means, including monitoring by more senior regulators and the use of various carrots and
sticks, including promotions, titles, office space, number of employees supervised, money, and so on.
If superiors could design an effective approach at acceptable cost, including careful monitoring of examiners and productive deployment of non-monetary carrots and sticks, there would
be little or no need for monetary incentives tied to objective metrics.94 But designing and implementing such an approach at acceptable cost is often tricky, whether for reasons of institutional
inertia, workplace politics, or otherwise. Where monitoring has
92

See, e.g., Tung, “Pay for Banker Performance,” supra note 19 at __.
This is not to say this is the only place where incentives are important. Incentives matter throughout the hierarchy. The right form of incentives will depend on the relative costs and benefits of the different types applied at each
stage.
94
If such a system were optimal, there would be no need for monetary incentives. If it were totally ineffective, the need for monetary incentives would be
essential. Reality likely lies somewhere along the spectrum between these two
extremes.
93
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failed to produce good outcomes, it makes sense to rethink the
fundamental design of the carrots and sticks.95 Organizations in
this situation frequently resort to self-triggering pay mechanisms
tied to external, objective metrics, like stock price.
Corporate executive compensation offers a useful analogy.
As earlier discussed, CEOs act as agents for shareholders, and before the 1990s, shareholders (acting through boards of directors)
tried a largely non-monetary carrot-and-stick-plus-monitoring approach to reducing managerial agency costs. This approach was
only modestly successful, and it generated perverse incentives for
CEOs to game the metrics by, for example, empire building to
maximize company size and the number of employees. Boards
were often considered tools of their CEOs, and the payment of subjectively determined bonuses ostensibly tied to performance was
often suspect. The pay-for-performance revolution in executive
compensation arose because the costs of better monitoring were
thought to be higher than an approach tying compensation to selfactivating, objective metrics. It was far simpler and more effective
to link manager pay directly with shareholders’ desired outcomes
(that is, to pay them like owners) than to design an ex ante set of
performance metrics and then monitor to ensure the conscientious
pursuit and achievement of those metrics.
The analogy to examiners is imperfect, however, since taxpayers are the principals and examiners do not sit at the top of their
organizational hierarchies as CEOs do. But the incentive issues are
generalizable to any case in which there is a tradeoff between design of internal metrics and monitoring on the one hand and objective, external metrics on the other hand. Moreover, firms offer
other examples more closely analogous to examiners. For instance,
salespeople often enjoy incentive pay tied to specific external metrics, like sales volume or even stock price, and oftentimes these
sales staff are the only ones in the firm hierarchy to receive this
kind of compensation. That is, sales managers may be paid with
lower-powered incentives than sales staff. This is because salespeople occupy the place in the distribution chain with the greatest
independence and discretion and where the design and monitoring
95

The abject regulatory failures described above make plain that this condition has been met with respect to banking regulation. See supra __.
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of behavior is likely to be the most difficult. Examiners occupy an
analogous place in the bank supervision hierarchy. As earlier described, examiners are at the sharp end of the regulatory stick.
They enjoy wide discretion in evaluating banks’ assets and operations, and their continuing blessing or indifference can shield a
troubled bank from corrective action long past the point of salvageability.
B.

Mapping Incentive Pay for Regulators

This section explains our approach to incentive pay for
regulators with reference to the recent reform proposals for bank
CEO pay. Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework for thinking
about the compensation problem for bank CEOs and bank regulators. On the vertical axis is the level of effort exerted by the agent,
be it bank CEO or regulator; on the horizontal axis is the purpose
or end goal of that effort. At the left end of the horizontal axis is
the private purpose of shareholder wealth maximization; at the
right end is the public purpose to avoid losses to the government
insurance fund. Both axes are measured from the point of view of
the principal for the agent in question: shareholders and the public,
respectively.
1.

Performance Pay for Bankers

In this framework, the ideal point from the perspective of
shareholders of an ordinary company would be high effort for the
purely private interests of the company. This is the upper left corner of our Purpose-Effort compensation space in Figure 1. Compensation contracts we observe for public company executives aim
for this corner solution, but given positive agency costs, the practical result is a deviation in the direction of lower effort. In addition,
given the business judgment rule and other permissive rules that
enable corporate agents to pursue goals other than shareholder
wealth maximization, there may be deviation toward public purposes as well.
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FIGURE 1
Prior to the Financial Crisis, bank CEOs were roughly in
the same part of the Figure 1 compensation space as CEOs of nonfinancial firms, since the CEOs of large multi-national corporations and large bank holding companies had very similar compensation contracts. CEOs of both kinds were paid mostly in stock and
stock options, which are designed to move CEOs as close to the
Shareholder ideal point as is efficient given monitoring costs.
The Financial Crisis, however, brought into clear focus the
need to alter bankers’ pay packages to include a greater element of
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public purpose. Given the government guarantees, either implicit
(as in the bailouts of Citigroup and AIG) or explicit (as with FDIC
insurance), undergirding bank risk taking, bank shareholders do
not suffer the full costs from the risk taking that comes with paying
bank CEOs to maximize shareholder value. Bank shareholders
therefore have even stronger incentives than shareholders of nonfinancial firms to push their agents toward the Shareholder ideal
point. In this context, paying bank CEOs to maximize bank shareholder value may result in socially inefficient levels of risk, including systemic risk.
Though banks are private companies, their importance to
the economy and to the public, as well as their fragility in the face
of runs, provides the justification for government guarantees. At
the same time, however, the socially ideal point for banks in Figure
1 cannot be the Shareholder ideal point. Instead, because social
goals as well as private goals should inform banks’ conduct, the
Social welfare ideal point toward which banks should strive is
somewhere to the right of the Shareholder ideal point—that is,
away from private shareholder wealth maximization on the horizontal axis and toward the public goal of avoiding losses to the
government insurance fund. We are agnostic about the appropriate
proximity of the Social welfare ideal point to the corner solution of
avoiding all losses to the government insurance fund. We leave
space between the Social welfare ideal point and the upper right
corner in order to account for the real possibility that maximizing
social welfare may require a level of bank risk taking greater than
what would assure no losses to the government insurance fund.
Moreover, the location along the horizontal axis of this Social welfare ideal point likely varies by the type of financial institution,
market context, individual CEO, and other factors. We can only be
confident that it lies somewhere to the right of the Shareholder
ideal point.
Because of the public as well as private purposes that animate banking and government support for banking, CEOs of
banks, bank holding companies, and other systemically important
financial institutions should be given incentives to take account of
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the social costs of bank risk taking and bank failure.96 It is unlikely
that bank CEO compensation was optimally set prior to the Financial Crisis. Understandably, then, the various academic proposals
for banker pay reform discussed earlier seek to move the average
bank CEO’s compensation contract in the direction of greater public purpose, that is, toward the Social welfare ideal point and away
from the Shareholder ideal point.
The Bank CEOs arrow in Figure 1 illustrates. Proposed reforms attempt to move CEO compensation contracts from their
current location somewhere into quadrant I, as shown on Figure
1.97 Any move in quadrant I increases the public purpose of effort
and would therefore be a valuable change according to these reforms.98 In general, moves in the direction of the Social welfare
ideal point are likely to be social welfare improvements.
Moves into quadrant IV, which also increase the public
purpose of CEO actions, might also be improvements, but this
would depend on the tradeoff with reduced effort on the part of
CEOs. It might be that the gains from being more public welfare
regarding would be greater than the efficiency losses from increased slack, but it is uncertain. What is clear is that any moves
into quadrants II or III would not be improvements.
2.

Performance Pay for Regulators

We now turn to regulator pay. As shown on Figure 1, the
moves are analytically similar to the goal of improving bank CEO
pay. Because of their low-powered incentives and job security,
regulators are thought to exert less effort than the regulated. At the
same time, regulators act more in the public interest than in the
private interest of the banks they regulate. Regulators do not act
96

For CEOs of public companies, by contrast, issues of systemic risk are
largely irrelevant. Therefore no public purpose need be included as part of their
optimal compensation contract.
97
Ironically, Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay provision, requiring a shareholder
vote to approve executives’ pay, may actually move bank CEO compensation
contracts away from the Social welfare ideal point and into quadrant II, shareholders generally prefer their CEOs to focus.
98
A move along the vertical axis, that is, additional effort without any additional public purpose, would obviously not satisfy these goals, while a move
along the horizontal axis in quadrant I would.
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purely in the public interest for familiar reasons of capture, be it
from familiarity, the revolving door enticement, or other reasons.
The public, who are the principals in this compensation bargain,
would prefer that regulators expend more effort toward the public
interest. The location of the Social welfare ideal point on Figure 1
captures this idea. Our proposal hopes to nudge regulators in that
direction. And, as shown by the relative slopes of the two reform
vectors, our proposal is more focused on improving effort than improving purpose, while the banker compensation reform literature
has the opposite emphasis.
The structure of regulator incentives and bank CEO incentives are related. For example, from bank shareholders’ perspective, the optimal private incentives for bank CEOs may depend on
what risks and growth opportunities the regulatory environment
will permit.99 Similarly, for our purposes, the appropriate direction
and magnitude of regulators’ incentives will depend to a great extent on the structure of bank CEOs’ incentives. The more high
powered are bank CEOs’ private incentives to maximize shareholder wealth, the more high powered must regulators’ incentives
be in the direction of the public interest. That is, regulators’ publicregarding incentives should be strong enough to counter the private
risk taking incentives that banks create for their CEOs, to the extent such risk taking may be socially suboptimal.
As with bank CEOs, it may be that regulators’ moves in
quadrant IV (less effort; more public regarding) would be socially
efficient, but these are not likely to arise from our approach to increasing the incentives for effort. (We can imagine other proposals
that might make regulators more public regarding without necessarily increasing their effort.) More difficult to judge in the abstract
are moves into quadrant II. Although not the main focus of our
proposal, it is possible that incentives to work hard may move
99

See Anthony J. Crawford et al., Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations
and the Effects of Deregulation, 68 J. BUS. 231 (1995) (finding that bank CEO
pay became more high powered with the banking deregulation of the 1980s);
Vicente Cuñat & Maria Guadalupe, Executive Compensation and Competition in
the Banking and Financial Sectors, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 495 (2009) (same for
1990s banking deregulation); R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, Executive Pay
and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry, 39 J. FIN. ECON.
105 (1995) (finding a positive association between bank CEO pay and firm performance in the 1980s and a stronger association in deregulated markets).
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regulators into this quadrant (more effort; more private regarding).
In this case, the gains from additional effort in helping banks to be
more efficient and reducing regulatory burdens might be social
welfare improving. That is, the gains may exceed the costs of expected social losses from bank failures. The recent Financial Crisis
cautions against putting too much faith in this expectation, so our
proposal makes every effort to encourage additional effort for
regulators directed into quadrant I (and toward the Social welfare
ideal point), instead of quadrant II.100
No incentives are perfect, however, so we do not expect
bank regulators ever to reach the Social welfare ideal point. But
with better regulatory efforts in that direction, regulatory influence
may drive banks’ vector of activity more closely toward the public
interest.
C.

How Much Incentive?

Despite the seemingly patent need for better regulator incentives, we are mindful of the novelty of our idea. An important
preliminary question is the appropriate magnitude of the incentive
component of regulatory pay. We anticipate that a fixed salary will
continue to constitute the lion’s share of regulator pay. For several
important reasons, the incentive component should not be so large
as to swamp the regulator’s salary in importance. We tentatively
suggest that incentive pay should constitute up to 25 percent of the
regulator’s total pay at the start of the relevant incentive period, but
this is just an informed guess. Agency heads who give thought to
our general idea and better understand the tradeoffs between finan100

It is also possible that regulators might start to the right of the social welfare point. They may harbor too strong a sense of purpose to protect the deposit
insurance fund or taxpayers. Therefore, their socially optimal moves would be in
quadrant II. Although this does not seem to be the case for many regulators during the Crisis, when combined with the possibility of low effort, the case is
stronger that some of this may have been going on. Very low effort combined
with even extremely strong motives to reduce taxpayer losses could still explain
the Financial Crisis. In such cases, a more shareholder-regarding motivation
could incentivize examiners toward the social welfare optimum. The use of bank
equity in examiner compensation is designed to achieve this goal, as we describe
below. See infra Part XX.
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cial incentives and other factors may have good reasons for greater
or lower percentages, especially after some trial and error.
We simply point out the important tradeoffs inherent in this
decision. Too small an incentive component risks irrelevance, of
course. The incentive component should be large enough to offer
real incentive to the regulator. On the other hand, too large an incentive component runs important risks, of which we discuss two.
1.

Regulator Risk Aversion

Too large an incentive component may stoke regulatory
risk aversion. Incentive pay is by definition variable, and the larger
is the portion of the regulator’s pay that is incentive pay, the
greater is the range of total pay that the regulator can expect to receive. If the incentive component is so large that the regulator cannot afford to suffer a loss, she might simply take the conservative
course, adopting a maximin strategy.101 She would be willing to
forego any potential gains from being aggressive or innovative in
order to avoid any losses.
Consider an examiner with a base salary of $100,000 and a
variable pay component with three possible outcomes: plus
$50,000, minus $50,000, and zero. If she regulates aggressively,
she stands a 50-50 chance of gaining or losing $50,000; if she
regulates conservatively, her variable pay will be zero for sure. If
she is risk neutral and has low fixed costs, then she should be financially indifferent between aggressive and conservative regulation, since the total expected value in both cases is $100,000. But a
risk averse examiner with larger fixed costs might strongly prefer
the conservative approach, since she will net $100,000 for sure.
Aggressive regulation is too risky, since the examiner runs a 50%
chance of winding up with only $50,000 in total pay. That possibility is sufficiently unattractive that even the chance to make
$150,000 would not induce her to regulate aggressively.
The design of the incentive securities will of course be important in managing the variance in the incentive component of
101

In game theory, this is a strategy designed to maximize one’s minimum
payoff. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW
(1998).
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regulator pay. The proportion of total pay that is incentive pay will
matter as well.
2.

Regulator Self-Selection

Regulators have employment choices, and we believe that
regulators’ choice to be regulators derives at least in part from their
interest in public service. This public spirit is an important regulatory asset and should be husbanded. Some might fear that too aggressive an incentive pay structure might affect the public service
culture of the regulatory agency. For example, if half of a regulator’s total annual expected pay were in the form of variable incentive compensation, that might change the nature of the regulatory
enterprise from one of supervision to “profit”-sharing. The type of
person that chooses to be a bank examiner could change, for example. Public service motives might be displaced by financial motivations among new hires after implementation of an incentive
compensation scheme. Eventually, the composition of the regulatory agency could change for the worse.102
Given the incremental approach to incentive pay that we
propose, any selection effects from variability of pay are likely to
be minor, at least in the early stages. More generally, the possibility that increased pay variability might change the mix of individuals opting to serve as examiners could be a good thing. As discussed earlier,103 examiners screened by their commitment to the
public interest were in fact insufficiently attentive to that interest.
Accordingly, attracting individuals interested in a variable pay-forsocial-performance compensation structure may be a beneficial
change.
D.
Potential Ancillary Benefits
Our performance pay scheme would not only help ameliorate the sorts of “false negative” failures that facilitated the Crisis,
but by giving bank examiners economic stakes in regulated banks,
our approach might have other salutary effects as well.

102

Below we address the more general objection that any incentive pay may
have this corrosive effect. See infra Part VI.A.1.
103
See supra Part III.C.
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Besides faithfully executing the existing oversight scheme,
examiners may have incentive to innovate in ways that improve the
value of their regulated banks. Under the current fixed salary approach, examiners have no strong incentive to change the regulatory system in ways that improve or protect bank values or taxpayer interests. Instead, as with the inertia they demonstrated in the
face of bad news at their regulated banks preceding the Crisis, examiners may prefer just to do what they are told and work to the
letter of the examinations manual.
With a stake in the bank’s value, an examiner may come up
with ways to examine more efficiently—say, by streamlining the
examination process at her specific bank or working with higher
level regulators to initiate broad-based changes. Improvements in
the oversight process might move toward more stringent supervision as well. An examiner might more aggressively seek out information from the bank in order to enhance the precision of her
assessment of the bank’s situation. This might also lead to broaderbased change across banks as individual examiners begin to experiment. For example, the level of banks’ public disclosures may
be suboptimal because of market failures that regulators can
solve.104 The individual examiner may not be able to capture the
entire value of her innovation, but having some economic stake in
the process at least moves her in the right direction.
One might be skeptical that there is much that examiners
could do to increase firm value by making regulation more efficient. But there is some evidence to the contrary. In the period before the Financial Crisis, banks had a choice of regulator, and regulatory agencies competed to offer the most attractive set of regulations and regulatory policies. The premise of this competition must
have been a belief by banks that they could increase their share
price by choosing the “best” regulator. No doubt this scenario, like
our proposal, creates the potential for a race to the bottom. For our
part, we hope to solve this problem by not only awarding regulators the gains from making regulations more efficient but also penalizing them when their regulatory choices result in bank losses or
failures. But the point remains that regulatory choices undoubtedly
104

See Robert P. Bartlett III, Making Banks Transparent, __ VAND. L. REV.
__ (2011).
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can increase bank value. Cabined by the downside constraint on
“deregulation,” we nevertheless believe that some of this value remains, or should at least be something regulators pursue.
Linking examiner pay to bank performance may also effect
a fundamental change in the relationship between the regulator and
the regulated. Far from being the enemy, under our proposal the
examiner is now on the same side with the bank, insofar as she has
some economic interests aligned with the bank’s. The bank knows
that the more money it makes, the more money the examiner
makes. Though their time horizons may be decidedly different, this
is a much softer point of conflict than the typically oppositional
alignment of regulator and regulated. This cooperative alignment
may result in greater information sharing, more honest brokering,
and greater efficiencies of the regulatory process.
The power of a simple rhetorical or positional change can
be seen in the implementation of the prompt corrective action rules
in the wake of the S&L Crisis. The problem of excessive forbearance under political pressure was “solved” by a simple statutory
change that required regulators to act under certain conditions, instead of leaving it optional. Importantly, the mandatory obligation
contained in the statute was not readily enforceable, so the question is why it mattered at all. The simple answer is that it gave
well-meaning regulators a plausible excuse to resist political pressure – “I’d love to help you, Senator, but the law requires me to
act.” This changes the dynamic between regulators and their congressional masters in ways that are viewed as highly effective.
Similarly, changes in the compensation of regulators may enable
them to offer bank managers the credible claim that they are on the
same team.
***
Although the theoretical case for linking bank regulators’
pay to bank performance seems relatively straightforward, the details of the incentive structure are crucial. sIn the next Part, we take
a first pass at structuring a regulatory pay-for-performance contract, recognizing that efficient contracts will only be developed
over time through trial and error.
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V. THE STRUCTURE OF PERFORMANCE PAY FOR REGULATORS
In most areas outside of banking, tying bureaucrats’ pay
more explicitly to social welfare outcomes might be difficult given
problems of incommensurability, data availability, and the lack of
agreed-upon metrics. It might be impossible to craft a sensible pay
package for EPA officials regulating air pollution, for example,
since the balance between economic output and pollution may be
difficult to measure. Fortuitously, however, performance metrics
exist for bank regulators, as well as financial instruments that can
measure both upside and downside impacts from regulatory
choices.
For logistical reasons, our target regulator is the bank-level
examiner whose regulatory responsibility is confined to one
bank.105 As we discuss below, it is possible that incentive compensation could be sensibly applied up and down the regulatory hierarchy, as well as to other agencies, but the case of the bank examiner is the most straightforward one of which we are aware. We
leave it to future work to extend our analysis to these other cases,
which present more logistical hurdles than theoretical objections.
As noted above,106 the regulatory laxity in the run-up to the
Financial Crisis involved two distinct types of regulatory failure—
the failure to apply preventive medicine when times were good and
the failure to act aggressively when a bank showed signs of distress.107 Regulators’ incentive pay should have two distinct components to address these separate problems. The first is a variable
compensation component based on the market value of a mix of
the regulated bank’s debt- and equity-based securities. This debtequity portfolio would offer real time market feedback to the regulator regarding the bank’s risk taking and its potential rewards.
105

This focus reduces the possibilities for strategic behavior that might occur if a regulator were to have oversight roles with respect to multiple banks and
also hold stakes in those banks. It would be undesirable if such a regulator were
to take a portfolio approach to maximizing the value of her bank holdings. She
might be willing, for example, to sacrifice the value of one bank for a larger
increase in the value of another bank in her portfolio.
106
See supra Part III.B.
107
See supra __ and accompanying text.
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This component would matter primarily during good times, while
the bank is operating in the ordinary course. The primary purpose
of this component is to incentivize preventive and remedial measures well before a bank approaches distress. The second component becomes important as a bank approaches distress. It consists
of a bonus for which the regulator would be eligible based on the
timing of her decision to shut down a failing bank. Regulators have
a number of reasons to wait too long before shutting down a failing
bank, as our earlier discussion described.108 The shutdown bonus
would ameliorate this problem.
We elaborate on these various features of our regulatory
pay-for-performance scheme below.
A.

The Debt-Equity Portfolio

We propose to incentivize bank regulators toward efficient
regulation by linking some portion of their pay to the market value
of the publicly traded debt and equity securities of the banks they
regulate. The idea of linking the pay of agents with the economic
outcomes enjoyed by the principals they represent is not new. We
take lessons from the executive compensation literature to structure
our debt-equity portfolio for regulators. For the typical firm manager, pay is linked to stock price, which is the best available metric
for the value of the firm, as well as the social value of the enterprise. Although imperfect, managers paid with firm shares have
greater incentives to increase the value of the firm than managers
paid fixed salaries. Similarly, regulators paid in bank shares would
have greater incentives to design and implement regulations to increase the value of bank shares.
If there were no externalities from individual bank activity
or risk levels, we could stop there. But of course externalities exist.
Risk taking at one bank can affect the financial stability of other
banks and the banking system as a whole, as the Great Financial
Crisis has amply illustrated. Together with the bank runs from the
numerous panics of the 19th Century, the Great Depression, and the
S&L Crisis, these episodes confirm that individual banks’ activities have stronger social welfare implications than non-financial
108

See supra Part III.B.
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firms. Hence the need for bank managers to be compensated in a
way that accounts for the potential social losses from their decisions, as recent reform proposals argue. Our claim is that this is
also true for regulators.
As is true for bank managers, there is a ready metric that
can serve as a useful proxy for the potential for bank losses falling
on taxpayers. A publicly traded debt instrument is sensitive to the
downside risk of its issuer, and therefore provides the downside
equivalent of what share price signals about upside potential. But
while it may make sense for bank managers to focus mostly on increasing bank value subject to some downside risk, the opposite is
likely true of regulators. If we could design an optimal contract for
CEOs, regulators might be unnecessary, but absent such a perfect
contract, a division of labor in which managers focus mostly on
gains while regulators worry most about losses might be the most
efficient. Accordingly, we believe the lion’s share of regulator’s
debt-equity portfolio should consist of the debt-based instrument.
This would give the regulator a personal financial stake in curbing
excessive risk taking at the bank. Holding only debt incentives,
however, might cause the regulator to be too risk averse, which
would unnecessarily limit credit availability and the bank’s profitability. We therefore also include equity-based pay in the regulator’s pay package.109

109

The pay of bank managers and regulators might be related. Though they
play separate and somewhat opposing roles, their respective pay structures could
be substitutes for each other. The more bank managers are paid in bank stock,
the more regulators would need to be paid in bank debt in order to police the
extra risk taking that bank managers would be incentivized to pursue. Shareholders of a bank might alter the pay of bank managers in light of regulator pay
structures, and vice versa. We leave it to another paper and a formal model in
development to explore these issues more fully. For now we simply claim that
given the heavy equity weighting of bank CEO pay, regulators’ pay should focus mostly on debt.
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B.

Structuring the Debt-Equity Portfolio

For both debt and equity components, awarding the actual
securities is not necessary.110 Instead, the underlying securities
would be used as benchmarks, with incentive pay based on the
market price of the underlying securities after a given reference
date. For example, if performance and incentive pay were awarded
each calendar year, the examiner should receive a “phantom” allocation of the bank’s debt- and equity-based instruments at the beginning of each year. This avoids the conventional objections to
government ownership of stakes in private businesses and the potential for insider trading by that might arise when regulators sold
securities to monetize gains.
To encourage a medium- to long-term regulatory perspective, each year’s allocation should have a “holding” period. Only
after some prescribed period, say three to five years after the initial
award, would a given year’s allocation be cashed out by paying the
regulator the then market value of the allocation. With annual allocations with multi-year holding periods, the regulator would hold
multiple tranches of phantom securities with staggered maturities,111 giving the regulator incentive to consider the long-term as
well as short-term consequences of her regulatory decisions, and
making short-term manipulatons of securities prices an unattractive
strategy. We are not confident in our abilities to divine the optimal
length of such holding periods, which we imagine would vary by
agency, bank, time period, examiner, and other factors. We anticipate that the optimal holding period will develop over time based
on experience.
Below, we describe a range of possible approaches for implementing the examiner’s debt-equity portfolio.

110

The examiner should not be allowed to trade in any of the bank’s securities or instruments in any event, so holding the underlying securities would not
only be unnecessary. It would be forbidden. See infra Part __.
111
For example, with a three-year holding period, after three years, the
regulator would always hold three tranches of phantom securities, which would
mature in succession at the next three calendar years-end.
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Bank Debt Incentives

There are (at least) two potential benchmarks on which the
debt feature of this package could be based: (i) a subordinated debt
security issued by the bank or (ii) a credit default swap contract
(CDS) referencing a junior debt obligation of the bank holding
company parent of the regulated bank.112 The prices of publicly
traded subordinated debt securities and CDS contracts reflect the
market’s best estimate of the risk of default of the bank underlying
the security or contract. We would adjust debt prices for compensation purposes in order to filter out the effects of industry-wide or
market-wide debt price movements. To the extent possible, the
regulator’s incentive pay should reflect bank-specific developments and not changes in debt markets generally.
Subordinated debt is junior to depositor liabilities, and of
course is uninsured. When a bank fails, subordinated debt holders
rarely recover anything.113 Similarly, when a banking institution
defaults on a debt obligation referenced in a CDS, this triggers the
obligation of the CDS seller to pay the CDS purchaser for losses
sustained on the insured amount of the banking entity’s defaulted
debt. Sub-debt holders and CDS sellers therefore have important
incentives to monitor bank risk taking. If a bank is healthy, its debt
securities will trade near face value.114 Similarly, the price of its
CDS contracts will be low.
When bank risk taking is excessive, however, sub-debt
holders will sell their debt. The market for subordinated bank debt
is well established,115 and banks engaging in excessively risky
112

A CDS acts like a debt instrument insofar as its trading price will reflect
the default risk of the reference entity. The CDS spread—the price one would
have to pay to insure against the reference entity’s default—rises and falls with
the probability of default. As discussed below, with respect to CDS contracts
referencing banking institutions, the reference obligation is almost always a
BHC debt obligation, and not an obligation of the bank itself. See infra __.
113
See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks are Not Allowed in
Bankruptcy, ________.
114
They may even trade above face value if market interest rates have
dropped since the debt securities were issued.
115
See infra note XX and accompanying text; Laurence H. Meyer, Supervising Large Complex Banking Organizations: Adapting to Change, in PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION, supra note XX, at 97, 103.
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strategies will see their sub-debt trading prices drop.116 If the bank
is at risk of default, its debt securities will trade at a discount reflecting the probability of default and the estimated payout in such
event. Similarly, the price of a CDS contract reflects the expected
losses from loans, bonds, or other reference obligations issued by
the underlying bank. CDS spreads for contracts written on large
publicly traded financial institutions react very quickly to new information.117 Therefore, as bank risk taking increases, CDS dealers
will raise the price at which they are willing to sell CDS protection
for the banking institution’s debt.
Market pricing serves as a transparent and continuing signal of the riskiness of the bank’s activities. Risk-related price fluctuations will directly affect bank examiners’ wealth when the debt
component is included in their personal portfolios. In this way, the
fine reflection of bank risk taking generates both important incentive and information effects. The debt feature of an incentive contract would give the examiner incentive to be vigilant in policing
excessive risk taking at the bank. If an examiner held 100 units of
phantom debt of a bank, for example, the units would be worth
about 100 if the bank were doing well. But if the bank were at risk
of default, the units might be worth, say, 50, reflecting the default
risk. If calibrated correctly, these phantom securities would give
regulators incentives to decrease the risk of default.
116

Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Sub-debt Yield Spreads as Bank
Risk Measures, 20 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 121, 133−35 (2001) (showing that subdebt yield spreads perform slightly better than capital measures as predictors of
banks’ financial condition); Mark J. Flannery & Sorin M. Sorescu, Evidence of
Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983–1991, 51 J.
FIN. 1347, 1373−74 (1996) (demonstrating that bond yields reflect investors’
pricing of bank risk taking); Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, Using Subordinated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is it Feasible?, 20 J. FIN.
SERVICES RES. 147, 147 (2001) (finding that bonds of highest liquidity offer the
most consistent pricing information for purposes of reflecting bank default risk).
117
Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap
Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings,_158 U. PENN. L. REV. 2085
(2010). Hart and Zingales also propose to incorporate CDS pricing into the regulatory apparatus, noting its ability to reflect excessive risk at the reference entity.
They would use CDS, however, as merely a trigger for regulatory action; they
do not propose incentive pay for regulators or the use of CDS in that endeavor.
Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial
Institutions (Sept. 2009).
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Using CDS or sub-debt as a benchmark for examiner pay
also serves an important related function. Market pricing acts
gradually to signal changes in the issuing bank’s risk profile, in
contrast to the sudden meltdowns that occurred at WaMu and other
banks that failed in the Crisis when regulators were too timid. Incorporating market-priced debt instruments as part of regulator pay
not only creates incentives for careful risk analysis; it also makes
price changes more salient to examiners and their supervisors as an
indicator of the capital market sentiment concerning risk taking at
the given bank. This greater prominence for crowd wisdom may
help may it more difficult for regulators to remain passive in the
face of mounting evidence of trouble at a given bank. Not only
might this information be valuable generally, for example, as a
warning signal for an examiner to devote more or less resources to
an examination. But it might also be sufficiently finely tuned to
give direct feedback on micro level regulatory changes. Just as a
stock price offers immediate signals to managers with imperfect
information, so too might public debt instruments help regulators
decide how to allocate their time and effort.
Empirical evidence supports the idea that regulators would
respond to debt incentives. Studies have shown, for nonfinancial as
well as financial firms,118 that firm risk taking declines as the proportion of a CEO’s wealth held in the form of her firm’s debt—
“inside” debt—increases relative to the value of her equity holdings. The presence of this inside debt shifts CEOs’ personal interests away from risk-preferring equity, aligning their interests more
closely with relatively risk averse debt holders.119
118

See, e.g., Tung & Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and
the Global Financial Crisis, supra note __ at __ (arguing .. . ); Patrick Bolton et
al., “Executive Compensation and Risk Taking,” Working Paper, May 2010
(finding this for financial firms); Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, “Stockholder and Bondholder Reactions to Revelations of Large CEO Inside Debt
Holdings: An Empirical Analysis,” Working Paper, 2010 (finding this for nonfinancial firms).
119
“Top management should . . . be given incentives to act on behalf of debtholders to an adequate degree. . . . [P]roviding managers with compensation
structures that have low pay-performance sensitivity may be optimal.” John &
Qian, supra note XX, at 110. Such compensation would admittedly dissuade
bank executives from the traditional pursuit of value for shareholders, which is
sometimes viewed as corporate managers’ exclusive goal. This should not give
(continued next page)

DRAFT AUGUST 24, 2011

52

HENDERSON AND TUNG

There is a theoretical explanation for this effect.120 While
equity compensation incentivizes managers to exert more effort—
thereby addressing the agency costs of equity—inside debt counters the risk-shifting incentives that accompany equity compensation, thereby reducing the agency costs of debt.121 Giving managers a stake in the value of the firm’s debt makes them less willing
to sacrifice its value to benefit shareholders, which is especially
important when the firm is in distress. Debt compensation can improve managerial effort and firm value in distress situations because, unlike equity, debt is sensitive to the firm’s liquidation
value. That is, debt holders may still recover value when the firm is
in distress.122 Managers holding inside debt may therefore be less
inclined to make risky bets when the firm gets into trouble.123
We have good reason to believe that bank debt incentives
will influence bank regulators in the same way, especially given
what we know about regulators and their mission. We should be
able to incentivize bank examiners by paying them based on
changes in the value of their bank’s subordinated debt securities or
changes in the price of CDS contracts written against the debt of
the bank’s parent holding company.124 Though each has its pluses
us much pause, however. Bank governance has traditionally been recognized as
presenting special concerns that deserve special governance tools. See supra
notes, XX and accompanying text.
120
Edmans & Liu, supra note XX, at 78.
121
While Jensen and Meckling consider the agency costs of equity and debt
separately, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 25, at 312, Edmans and Liu consider them simultaneously, thereby enabling analysis of the tradeoffs between
incentivizing managerial effort and influencing investment choice. See Edmans
& Liu, supra note XX, at 79 & n.5.
122
Equity holders are indifferent to the firm’s liquidation value because that
value goes to pay creditors. So while equity-based compensation gives managers
an incentive to avoid insolvency, it may also induce them to “inefficiently sacrifice liquidation value to gamble for solvency” when a firm is in distress. Edmans
& Liu, supra note XX, at 77. Debt holders will be less sanguine about squandering value on desperate investment strategies because their returns are fixed; they
will not share in any (low probability but) stupendous returns beyond the fixed
amount of their claims. Id.
123
The appropriate amount of debt depends on the relative magnitudes of
the two different types of agency problems—shirking versus risk shifting. Id.
124
One of us has argued in other work that a particular form of inside
debt—bank subordinated debt—could be especially useful as a form of bank
(continued next page)
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and minuses, discussed below, both may be extremely useful because their public trading prices will operate as a continuing public
referendum on risk taking at the bank.
2.

Subordinated Debt versus CDS

While both bank subordinated debt and CDS could offer
important incentives and market information for regulators, there
are important differences between the two, such that their best uses
may be different. As between subordinated bank debt and CDS,
evidence exists that CDS prices react more quickly to information
than subordinated debt prices do.125 This sensitive bellwether
would therefore offer more immediate feedback to regulators than
subordinated debt, so that prompt action could be taken.
Subordinated debt, however, may offer a few advantages
over CDS. Unlike sub-debt, which is issued at the bank level as
well as the BHC level, CDS contracts are typically written with
reference to BHC debt obligations and not those of the banking
subsidiary.126 Therefore, CDS prices will more accurately reflect
the default risk of the BHC than the bank. Major banks are almost
uniformly held as wholly owned subsidiaries of BHCs, and every
BHC owns other financial institutions besides the bank at issue,
although for the very largest banks, each bank constitutes the
dominant subsidiary within its BHCs. The larger is the percentage
of the BHC’s cash flow and assets that derive from the given bank,
the better will CDS pricing (that references BHC debt) reflect risk
at the bank. But as the proportions of BHC assets and earnings
contributed by the bank decrease, so will the clarity of CDS
spreads decrease as a signal of the bank’s health. Bank of America,
N.A., for example, is the dominant entity within its BHC, Bank of
America Corporation. Yet the bank represents only about 65% of
CEO compensation that would help curb excessive risk taking. Tung, supra note
1.
125
Blanco, Brennan, & Marsh, An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit-Default Swaps, 60 J. FIN.
2255 (2005).
126
We found one exception for which public price information was available. Bloomberg quotes CDS pricing for Capital One Bank, a banking subsidiary of financial holding company Capital One Financial Corporation.
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BHC assets and contributes only about 70% of BHC net income.
Performance of the other entities within the BHC will likely have a
nontrivial effect on overall BHC performance, so that CDS spreads
on Bank of America Corporation may only offer a noisy proxy for
risk taking at the bank, Bank of America, N.A.
A second limitation with CDS is coverage. Most large
banks issue subordinated debt that is publicly traded. By contrast,
regular CDS pricing data is available for only a handful of the very
largest BHCs.128 The very largest banks and BHCs are of course
the most important in terms of asset values and systemic risk, so
CDS still might be best for those institutions. Where both bank
sub-debt and BHC CDS pricing are available, it might be useful to
incorporate both into the debt component of regulators’ incentive
pay.
3.
BHC Equity
The debt component of regulator incentive pay should be
balanced with equity incentives in order to guard against the possibility of excessive risk aversion.129 Ideally, one would use equity
of the bank itself as the benchmark, since the market value of the
bank’s equity would offer the cleanest market assessment of the
bank’s upside prospects, and therefore a proxy for the value added
by regulators. Again, however, because major banks are almost
uniformly held as wholly owned subsidiaries of BHCs, no major
bank has publicly traded equity. BHC equity is the next best option, though it may offer a somewhat noisy proxy for performance
at the banking subsidiary.130
Rather than rewarding (or punishing) the regulator simply
based on BHC equity price movements, we propose two adjust128

A Bloomberg search showed only nine BHCs with regular CDS pricing
information.
129
Too much debt in managers’ compensation packages may make them
suboptimally risk averse, reducing long term value. Rangarajan K. Sundaram &
David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial
Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1553 (2007); David I. Walker, The Challenge of
Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 446–47
(2010). We can anticipate a similar effect if regulators’ portfolios are excessively overweighted with debt.
130
Among the ten largest banks, the average bank accounts for 61% of its
BHC’s assets and 131% of its earnings. See Appendix I for details [to come].
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ments to hone the regulator’s incentives. First, as with our debt
component, we suggest a relative performance approach, pursuant
to which the effect of industry-wide or market-wide equity price
movements would be filtered out of the regulator’s performance
pay. Ideally, an incentive compensation scheme would reward an
agent for only those effects within her control. But because no public securities exist to measure regulatory inputs alone, we must settle for second-best. To the extent we are able to excise market- and
industry effects from the regulator’s incentive pay, that works an
improvement to our scheme.
In addition to the relative performance adjustment, we suggest that the regulator should be exposed only to the upside of the
equity, and not the downside. In other words, the regulator can
only win with the equity-based component. The reason for this is
that exposure to downside equity volatility might make the regulator too timid. With equity value to lose, the regulator may be reluctant, for example, to expose poor management or risky practices at
the bank. The holding period for debt-equity allocations addresses
that problem to some extent. Given the inertia exhibited by regulators in the run up to the Financial Crisis, however, we should be
careful not to inadvertently incentivize inaction. This does not
mean that the regulator has nothing lose, of course. The debt component of her incentive pay includes downside potential but likely
with less volatility than equity.
4.

The Appropriate Mix of Debt and Equity

As earlier noted, we believe the lion’s share of this ordinary
course “preventive medicine” component of incentive pay should
be debt-based. Beyond that, the appropriate debt-equity mix in the
regulator’s portfolio will depend on a number of factors, some of
which will be specific to the regulated bank, to the regulating
agency, to the particular times, and perhaps even to the individual
examiner. We therefore make no attempt to offer firm prescriptions
for the right ratio. Instead, we discuss important considerations that
regulatory agencies should consider when structuring each regulator’s portfolio.
The right mix can induce regulators to care about bank
profits but not at the expense of risk shifting to creditors. Excessive
bank risk would diminish net incentive pay, provided that the
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negative reaction from debt markets reduced the value of the debt
component of the regulator’s incentive portfolio by more than any
positive reaction from equity markets augmented the value of the
equity component of the regulator’s portfolio.
We are confident that the optimal mix can best be determined through trial and error. Potential error costs, however, counsel for a gradual implementation of our proposal. Regulator compensation differs from executive compensation insofar as experimentation with executive pay occurs among the thousands of private firms that exist. Even if a mistake in incentive pay design
were so drastic as to cause the failure of a firm, this would be unlikely to have widespread impact. By contrast, there are only a few
bank regulatory agencies, and a significant mistake in incentive
compensation design could affect the entire banking sector, and
perhaps beyond. Agency heads should therefore proceed slowly
and incrementally. The appropriate debt-equity mix is an area for
which more study and a conservative approach are likely warranted.
C.

The Shutdown Decision

In addition to the market-based ordinary course component
of incentive pay, we advocate an additional feature to address the
bank in distress. Specifically, we propose a bonus tied to the timing of the decision to shut down a failing bank. Especially for
larger banks, examiners will not enjoy unilateral authority to shut
down the bank. Instead, the decision will involve higher-level supervisors as well as examiners. Incentive pay for examiners still
makes sense in this context. Examiners will have the best information about their banks’ condition and prospects, and their experience with their banks will be critical in determining the optimal
timing of shutdown. Even absent formal authority to decide on
shutdown by themselves, examiners will enjoy enormous influence
over the decision. Incentives toward optimal shutdown timing
would encourage examiners to be forthcoming with information
important for the decision and to make unbiased recommendations
to higher-level regulators. These inputs are crucial for improving
shutdown timing.
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Why a Special Shutdown Bonus?

The shut down decision requires special treatment for two
main reasons. First, it is a tough call for the regulator to make. In
fact, it is the most drastic decision the regulator must make in her
supervision of the bank. As our earlier discussion suggests,131 the
regulator has a number of reasons for being reluctant to pull the
plug on a failing bank. Regulatory capture and the Stockholm effect may dissuade the regulator from putting the bank out of business. Pulling the plug might also highlight the regulator’s past mistakes in not intervening more forcefully. At any given point, the
regulator might prefer to wait and see, hoping the bank will turn
itself around.
The bank debt-equity portfolio that we propose as part of
the regulator’s compensation package may ameliorate this regulatory reluctance to some extent. The debt piece of the portfolio
could induce the regulator to attempt to shut the bank down before
it became massively insolvent, since continuing losses at the bank
would eat into the value of the bank’s debt and the debt portion of
the regulator’s incentive portfolio. On the other hand, it might be
difficult for the regulator to assess the bank’s solvency in real time,
since this involves an assessment of the bank’s asset values. With
uncertainty, a wait-and-see approach might seem attractive to the
regulator.132
Another reason for a special shutdown bonus is that market
signals are also likely to be noisy. Market discipline may not be
useful in prodding a regulator to shut down a bank because of information asymmetry. The optimal timing of the shutdown decision will depend to a great extent on fine-grained private information which (a) is available only to the regulator, and (b) is constantly being updated in real time once shutdown becomes a real

131

See supra Part III.C.
Of course, if the debt-equity ratio is miscalibrated so as to be too equity
rich, this will exacerbate this wait-and-see problem. If the potential gains to equity, which prefers additional risk during bad times, are greater than the potential debt losses, then this could induce the exact wrong behavior in regulators.
Weighting the incentive mix heavily with debt and having long vesting or holding periods should help reduce this problem.
132
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possibility. As such, a one-time bonus distinct from any market
assessment of the decision is advisable.
2.

Calculating the Bonus

Bank regulators are by statute tasked with the specific goal
of minimizing losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF).133 The
shutdown bonus could therefore be tied specifically to the ultimate
losses sustained by the DIF at the resolution of the FDIC’s receivership proceeding. A shutdown bonus would offer a direct incentive to make the right timing decision at a critical juncture. The
lessons from the Financial Crisis, like all others before it, show
that regulators will tend to err on the side of pulling the plug too
late rather than too early. This delay in the Crisis exacerbated
banks’ losses and the ultimate costs to the DIF. Our approach is to
award high bonuses for low losses and vice-versa. As to scale, the
bonus should be potentially large enough to induce the regulator to
forego her hopes of recovering significant value in her debt-equity
portfolio from a miracle turnaround by the bank. Absolute values
will depend on a comparison of the examiner’s expected payouts
under particular incentive contracts. If the examiner expects to reap
an expected value of $10 if the bank survives and becomes profitable, but the potential downside to the DIF has a positive expected
value, then the examiner should be compensated more than $10 for
the shutdown decision.134 Information about these various parameters may become more accurate as the bank approaches failure, and
this may counsel for a shutdown bonus algorithm that adjusts and
can be manually updated over time. With learning and experience,
133

See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(a).
Although the shutdown bonus should offset the potential gains from a
decision to forbear in favor of a possible turnaround, this does not necessarily
mean that the bonus must be very large. When a bank is clearly distressed, the
probability of turnaround will likely be very small. So even if potential gains to
the examiner from a long-shot recovery would be large, the expected value of
forbearance would still typically be small given the low probability of success.
Multiplying the value from a successful turnaround by the probability of that
turnaround will reduce the value of that strategy for the examiner. For example,
if the examiner expects to earn $100 in the event that the bank recovers, but the
probability of this is just 10%, then the shutdown bonus need be no greater than
$10.
134
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it may be possible to design a fully automated, less discretionary
system in which market and other data are incorporated into the
bonus algorithm.135
In theory, for example, if an examiner forces a bank to enter government receivership at time T1, and as a result FDIC losses
are 100, the examiner would get a larger bonus than if the decision
to shut down the bank is made at T2 when the FDIC losses would
be 200. If we could know the counterfactual values (that is, the
losses that would have occurred at T2), then the calculation would
be simple. There is no T2 in reality, however, so we cannot know
what the counterfactual losses would have been.
There are ways of addressing this practical concern. Agencies can develop a mechanism for estimating what losses would
have been had the examiner not acted when she did. For example,
post-mortem reports, like those described above, could be helpful.
The inspector general of the FDIC could estimate losses at hypothetical future intervals had the examiner not shut down the bank
when she did. These reports could deploy a mix of economic models, learning from past failures, and expert opinions from inside
and outside the regulatory agency.
This approach is not perfect, of course; it suffers from potential biases and manipulation. Most obviously, since the report is
written only after the decision has been made to shut down the
bank, ex post biases may result in loss estimates that differ significantly from what ex ante estimates would have shown. This could
lead to distorted incentives for examiners making shutdown decisions.
This problem is not fatal, however, so long as the potential
biases are not predictable ex ante—that is, estimates are not systematically too high or too low. The use of external expert opinions
to produce the loss schedules described above could reduce any
135

Moreover, to ameliorate these conflicting incentives, and consistent with
the end-game nature of the shutdown decision, at some point in the bank’s
downward spiral, the value of the examiner’s debt-equity portfolio should be
frozen for compensation purposes so that her only operating incentive is the
shutdown bonus. With no additional portfolio upside to gain from a long-shot
recovery by the bank, the examiner’s only focus will be on minimizing DIF
losses from the bank’s failure. Of course, if the bank recovers and shutdown is
avoided, the examiner’s portfolio should be unfrozen on the bank’s way up.
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bias. So long as the estimate is not expected to be biased one way
or the other, examiners should be incentivized simply to do their
best—to time a shutdown to minimize losses—since this is what
they will expect the ex post estimator to be doing.136 Some randomization among outside experts doing the ex-post analysis may
help ensure the optimal ex ante incentives.137
Alternatively, bonus payouts could be based on the percentage of recoveries the DIF is able to achieve. An algorithm
could be designed that would set bonuses at the best available level
given a particular bank’s characteristics and the losses suffered by
the DIF. Obviously, the larger the losses, the lower the payout. For
instance, if a particular bank is shutdown and the DIF eventually
suffers losses of $100, this amount could be compared with losses
suffered at other similarly situated banks. If another bank of similar size and objective economic characteristics had previously been
shutdown and resulted in losses of $200, this would be evidence
that the examiner in the first case had made a valuable shutdown
decision. The FDIC could collect data about failures and losses in
order to establish benchmarks for expected losses. This would give
examiners information about expected bonus payments for variously timed shutdown decisions.
3.

Additional Considerations

As the preceding discussion suggests, structuring shutdown
incentives will be tricky. It may be that they even overshoot: Examiners may be too aggressive in shutting down banks that have a
positive private and social value. One solution to this problem
might involve a non-trivial penalty if the DIF ultimately suffers no
losses after a bank is shut down. If the reason is that the examiner
pulled the plug too soon, there should be a financial cost to this
socially inefficient decision. Although this strikes us as a relatively
unlikely scenario, it is a factor that incentive contract designers
should consider depending on the nature of the entire compensation bargain.
136

See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Prediction
Markets for Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2007).
137
See id.
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Another issue is timing. DIF losses—and the related regulatory bonus—will likely not be finally determined until some
years after the bank is seized. The process of disposing of a failed
bank’s assets may take several years. Also the FDIC may enter into
loss sharing arrangements with asset acquirers in order to increase
the sale price of assets. So a "final" resolution will be hard to predict at the time of shutdown. Moreover, the regulator making the
shutdown decision may not be intimately involved in the asset sale
process.138 Of course, too long a gap between the shutdown decision and the realization of the bonus, and the intercession of other
actors in the asset disposition process, may vitiate the incentive
effect of any bonus. Nevertheless, the shutdown bonus may still
offer important motivation for the regulator to act promptly in closing down a bank, as compared to the current system of compensation. Though the timing of shutdown will have an important effect
on the final resolution and the amount of DIF losses, the regulator
currently has every incentive to wait to see, as was amply demonstrated during the Financial Crisis. A well-structured bonus may
help ameliorate this problem.

138

For example, the OCC makes shutdown decisions for the national banks
it supervises, but the FDIC is required to be appointed as the receiver for every
insured national bank. The OCC has resolution authority under 12 U.S.C. §
1818(b) (to make orders and formal written agreements); 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (to
issue capital directives); 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (to take Prompt Corrective Action
(PCA)); and 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (to issue safety and soundness orders). See
OCC Policies & Procedures Manual, PPM 5310-3 (REV), July 30, 2001, available at www.occ.gov/static/publications/ppm-5310-3.pdf. For a discussion of
new resolution authority rules for large banks and non-bank financial companies, see Brady Dennis, “FDIC’s new tools to close troubled banks offer opportunity, challenge,” WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/17/AR2011011704164.html.
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VI. QUALIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS
In this Part, we raise and respond to some potential objections to our proposal.
A.

Strategic and Perverse Incentives

Incentive structures may sometimes generate not only the
desired outcomes but also some that are unintended and undesired.
Our regulator incentive pay proposal is no exception. Time and
experience will enable agency heads to identify and address any
bad incentives that may arise from our proposal. In this section, we
discuss a few of the possibilities for bad incentives that we can anticipate.
1.

Crowding Out the Public Interest

One might object that incentive pay is fundamentally inconsistent with public service. Financial rewards for “success”
might change the public regarding culture within regulatory agencies; financial incentives may crowd out the public spiritedness
that would otherwise motivate employees. The possibility of financial rewards tied to market metrics might change regulators’ perception of their charge. Instead of diligent altruistic service to the
public, regulators and other agency employees might begin to view
their roles in terms of market exchange. Regulators’ desiring
higher compensation would pursue the proffered financial rewards,
while those who value leisure might feel free to work less and
forego the potential financial rewards for diligence. Once diligence
has been priced, perhaps some regulators will slack.139
We do not discount this concern. Social scientists have
documented this crowding-out effect in experimental settings. We
139

See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
1, 14 (2000) (describing an experiment where the use of financial incentives led
to worse performance by experimental subjects); Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 687 (2002) (discussing interaction of economic incentives with intrinsic and social incentives).
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do not believe, however, the effect is necessarily universal or sufficiently well understood that experimentation with incentive compensation for regulators should be precluded.140 Moreover, as described above, the federal government has already begun experimenting with financial incentives for regulators. Enormous pay
raises have been implemented at several executive agencies. Bank
regulators have received bonuses for good performance during the
crisis. These examples suggest that public spiritedness and financial reward are not mutually exclusive, at least up to a point. Our
innovation is to rely on market pricing and specific observable outcomes to set bonus pay, instead of relying on fiat. Ours is an incremental step designed to link such bonus programs more explicitly to proxies for the social welfare function of regulators, to make
incentive pay more transparent and less subject to political, class,
racial or other biases, and to increase the sensitivity of such programs to performance. In addition, by committing in advance to a
bonus or incentive scheme linked to bank performance, agencies
can subtlety but importantly change the nature of the relation between regulator and regulated. The possibility that a bonus might
be paid if an agency head determines that the examiner did a
“good” job is fundamentally weaker in this pursuit than a contract
that aligns the interests of the examiner and the bank managers.
2.

Insider Trading

As with any incentive scheme involving publicly traded securities, there is the possibility that security holders with access to
non-public information will use that information to earn profits at
the expense of those with access only to publicly available information. Our proposal to use phantom securities goes a long way
toward reducing this problem. In effect, examiners can “sell” their
securities only to the agency, and therefore there can be no victim,
since there will not be any third parties involved. Vesting or holding periods will also help reduce this problem.

140

It may be, for example, that economic incentives may substitute for social incentives, but that nominal economic incentives may be too weak. Cf.
Gneezy & Rustichini, supra (finding that nominal economic rewards and penalties led to worse performance).
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Given that examiner bonuses depend on positive market
price movements, examiners may also be tempted simply to leak
non-public information about the banks they oversee. While this is
not an implausible scenario given our proposed incentive structure,
it is not a strong objection. Examiners and other regulators already
have incentive to misuse non-public information they obtain in the
course of their work. For example, they may sell the information to
traders. Or they may use accomplices to trade based on their private information. Work rules already restrict this misuse of information, and our proposal does not make it more or less likely.
Whatever risk remains from regulators using their privileged position to earn profits that violate existing insider-trading laws, they
are no greater than exist under current compensation practices. Examiners could tip information about bank prospects in return for
cash payments, but they can do this today. And, in any event, such
practices are illegal. That said, agency heads should be mindful of
potential abuses or changes in behavior that are not desired or expected, and adjust pay practices or bring legal actions accordingly.
B.

Noisy Proxies

A basic objection to our approach is that it simply won’t
work. Our market-based incentives may be too blunt to be effective. Even after adjustments for relative performance,141 many important influences besides the regulator’s input will affect the market pricing of the bank’s debt- and equity securities. Decisions by
the CEO and senior officers, for example, will generally dwarf the
regulator’s influence over the bank’s performance and the market
price of its securities. If the regulator’s decisions have little impact
on the bank or the price of its securities, the argument goes, then
our scheme will have weak if any incentive effects on regulators.
Private sector behavior should offer some guidance here.
Private firms in a number of industries typically use option compensation to incentivize not only executives but the rank and file as
well. This despite the fact that any given employee’s influence on
overall firm performance is likely to be small. Even though any
given employee may not clearly see any effect of her actions on the
141

See supra Parts V.B.1, V.B.3.
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value of her option compensation, holding a stake in the firm must
still incentivize her to some extent. Otherwise, firms would not
bother with option compensation outside of the executive suites.
Though a given employee’s actions may not generally affect the value of the firm or the value of her options, she may still
work harder at the margin because of her stake in the firm. There
may also be specific situations where her input is crucial, though it
may be difficult to predict ex ante which specific contributions by
which employees will later be important.
Similarly, with regulators, it may be that for most banks,
especially during good times, regulatory action has no effect on
bank value or the value of most banks’ securities. However, when
a bank strays, prompt and effective regulatory action may be critical to avoiding large losses in the future. For this bank and this
regulator, the incentives may matter.
C.

Why Not Just Improve Bank CEO Incentives?

Given the existing learning on performance pay for executives, as well as post-Crisis proposals to modify bank CEO incentive pay to address excessive risk taking, one might fairly wonder
why incentive compensation should extend to regulators. Why not
just tinker with bank CEO compensation structure, as one of us has
suggested?
By itself, adjustment of CEO incentive structures is unlikely to offer a complete solution to excessive bank risk taking.
There are good reasons to doubt that a CEO could be ideally incentivized in such a way that regulatory effort would be unnecessary.
Bank CEOs and regulators each have specialized functions. They
play different roles, with different constituencies and different information sets. We could incentivize CEOs to act like regulators,
but then there would be far less play for conventional corporate
governance mechanisms to operate. The benefits of specialization
would be lost.
CEOs and regulators both suffer from bounded rationality,
as well. So the conceptually optimal set of CEO incentives might
either be too difficult to comprehend, or if simplified, might be
more blunt than could be achieved with the specialist regulator involved in affecting the CEO's behavior and the bank’s behavior.
Similarly, attempting to craft optimal CEO incentives in order to
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obviate the need for the regulator would require Herculean expertise on the part of the crafter of the incentive structure (presumably
the regulator).
D.

Why Not Just Improve Examiners’ Incentives
within the Agency?

A natural reaction to our market-based approach might be
to try less drastic, more incremental reforms first. The most obvious incremental reform would be to simply improve examiners’
internal incentive structures within their agencies. We have readily
acknowledged the various moving parts to our market-based approach that would have to be ironed out over time with experience.
Why undertake this wholesale change in examiner pay before less
drastic measures had been tried?
Private firms of course use internal benchmarks to evaluate
and reward employee performance, as well as market-based instruments like stock options. Internal benchmarking makes sense
for private firms: Certain necessary “support” functions within private firms—strategic planning or human resources or public relations, for example—do not contribute directly to the bottom line.
External market-based measures may therefore offer poor indicators for employees’ performance in these areas.
Despite this insulation from market indicators, however, we
harbor some faith that private firms can construct suitable internal
evaluation criteria for their employees. Poor internal benchmarks
would hurt firms’ overall performance and profits, perhaps even
leading to their demise.
With government agencies, of course, no similar market
pressure exists to correct poor internal benchmarking. Though the
Crisis focused more intense Congressional and public attention on
bank regulatory agencies’ performance, the agencies continue to
exist in the wake of the Crisis and examiners continue in their positions.142 We are therefore skeptical that rearranging internal per142

We are not aware of any examiner or high-level regulator losing her job
as a result of poor performance in the Crisis. OTS, which had regulatory responsibility over WaMu and AIG before the Crisis, has been merged with the OCC.
This elimination of an agency is, of course, quite rare. The demise of OTS was
not solely a result of its failings in the Financial Crisis. From its inception in
(continued next page)
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formance metrics could offer a complete solution to the incentive
problems we have identified.
Moreover, market-based metrics are likely to impound the
effects of regulatory action exactly when that action matters most.
For ordinary banking operations in normal times, a bank examination is unlikely to disturb the bank’s existing business model or
affect the market pricing of its public securities very much. However, with a troubled bank, investors will keep a close watch over
the regulatory actions to which the bank is subjected, and the nature and effect of these actions will be reflected in the bank’s securities prices.
E.

Increased Compensation Costs

Some might worry that market-based compensation will
potentially increase the costs of compensating regulators. In boom
years, for example, the value of some examiners’ phantom bank
debt and equity portfolios might balloon in value, independent of
examiner performance. While this is certainly a possibility, the
government can easily hedge against this risk.
Most obviously, the government could hold debt and equity
positions in banks that exactly match the phantom securities held
by examiners, dollar for dollar. In this way, if the examiner’s pay
were to rise by $100 as a result of an increase in a bank’s value, the
government’s position would also rise by $100, resulting in no effective increase in compensation costs. One may object on the
ground that this would require the government to take ownership
stakes in banks, but this objection is not as significant as it may
seem. For one, the government could take non-voting stakes or enter into an arrangement with a third party where it is merely the
beneficial owner of the shares but without control over them.
1989, many questioned the adviseability of a separate regulator for thrifts, and
calls for its merger into the OCC or FDIC have been around as long as the
agency itself. Moreover, the legislation merging OTS into the OCC goes to great
lengths to assure that no OTS employees will actually lose their jobs or suffer a
pay cut! Robert Schmidt & Phil Mattingly, A Thrift Regulator Fades (Sort of)
into the Sunset, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 14, 2010, available at:
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/10_43/b4200038824455.
htm.
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Moreover, given the relatively small amounts of compensation involved, the stakes the government would have to hold would be
relatively tiny. If there is a single examiner working with a particular bank, and the examiner has a compensation upside of a few tens
of thousands of dollars, the government’s stake in the bank would
be utterly miniscule and pale in comparison with the other avenues
by which the government influences banks.
Derivatives and other synthetic instruments could address
this problem as well by simply replicating expected payouts under
our compensation scheme. Such instruments would not be difficult
to create and would avoid any government ownership stake in any
bank. For instance, the government could buy call options on bank
stocks and debt securities. Because such a call option locks in the
price at which the government may purchase a bank’s stock or debt
in the future, this approach completely hedges the government’s
exposure to future appreciation in the bank’s securities.143 Importantly, options do not confer control rights or other complications
of government involvement with private firms.144
F.

Incentivizing the Right People

A final potential objection is that our focus on bank examiners may be incomplete because examiners constitute only one
link in the supervisory chain of command. There may be something to this objection. After all, private firms deploy incentive
compensation not just for the CEO, but for decision makers at
many levels in the hierarchy.
In the context of bank regulation, our proposal focuses on
examiners, but individuals both higher and lower in the hierarchy
may also play important roles in bank supervision. Their performance might also improve with incentive pay. Line examiners provide crucial inputs into large and complex examinations, while
143

A call option entitles the holder to buy a specified security at a predetermined price—the “strike price”—for a specified period. Assuming the government purchases at-the-money call options with the same duration as the phantom
securities used for examiner compensation, the government’s hedging expense
would be limited to the initial cost of the options.
144
The government could also purchase swap contracts to mimic the requisite cash flows from phantom stock and debt appreciation.
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higher-ups—an Assistant Deputy Comptroller or Deputy Comptroller for Large Bank Supervision, for example145—may have ultimate decision making authority on how to implement examiners’
conclusions. The incentive mechanisms we describe could be used
for all of these individuals, though additional considerations must
be addressed before deploying these mechanisms for higher-ups.
Higher-level bank regulators typically have oversight responsibilities for multiple banks. While incentivizing these regulators with public debt and equity securities of the multiple banks
they regulate might create useful incentives, possibilities for strategic behavior abound. A regulator holding a portfolio of banks’
securities may be incentivized to maximize the overall value of her
portfolio, instead of improving the value of each bank. She might
decide, for example, to focus all her attention on the bank in her
portfolio that she believes holds the highest potential for appreciation. Or more perversely, she might even find ways to promote the
fortunes of one bank over another if she believed that the favored
bank’s securities would appreciate more than the disfavored bank’s
securities would devalue.
Incentive pay could be structured to discourage this kind of
opportunism. For instance, a higher-level regulator’s portfolio of
phantom securities of multiple banks might be more debt-heavy
than the portfolio of an examiner responsible for only one bank.
This debt emphasis would magnify the effect of losses on the regulator’s incentive pay, which would encourage her diligent monitoring of all the banks under her supervision and discourage her from
attempting to pick favorites from among the banks. More sophisticated indexing approaches could also be devised.
Agency heads are likely best positioned to identify the employees for whom incentive compensation holds the most promise.
In general, the potential benefits of performance pay would seem
greatest for individuals with wide discretion and important decision making authority in the supervision process. Our review of
bank failure reports and banking supervision handbooks leads us to
identify examiners as promising candidates. We leave it to agency
heads to work out over time whether our pay-for-performance approach should be expanded up and down the hierarchy.
145

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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Differential eligibility for incentive pay within an organizational hierarchy may create unintended side effects in terms of
promotion and career progression. For example, examiners who
receive bonuses might not be interested in promotion to higherlevel jobs where incentive compensation is lower or non-existent.
While this is an issue to manage, it is not uncommon. As noted
above, firms often pay sales people with high-powered incentive
compensation that creates similar problems. Similarly, securities
and commodities traders typically enjoy high-powered incentive
pay that their supervisors do not. Even hourly workers may hesitate to accept promotion to salaried supervisory positions, since
accepting the salaried job often forsakes overtime pay. Among
regulators, one would expect some efficient sorting, with regulators with different skills sorting into positions based on their preferences and comparative advantages.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is no reason we can think of why regulators are not
paid for performance. The crucial issues are whether one can identify what “good” and “bad” performance are, whether contracts can
be written ex ante that operationalize these metrics, and whether
the potential negative effects from introducing a pay-forperformance culture for regulators outweigh the potential efficiency gains. We have argued that bank regulation is an area where
there are readily available metrics, where plausible contracts or
payment schedules could be devised, and where the potential for
crowd out or other downsides from incentive pay are limited.
Accordingly, we propose that bank examiners be paid in
part with a mix of debt-heavy incentives linked to bank equity and
debt values. This pay should represent a substantial but not dominant part of examiner pay, should be paid out over a number of
years, and should adjust in order to maintain incentives aligned
with the regulatory mission of ensuring that bank risk taking is
aligned with the social welfare.
Although seemingly radical, our proposal is consistent with
recent moves by regulators to pay bonuses for good work and to
generally increase the quality and efficiency of regulation. It is also
consistent with laws and academic proposals to alter bank CEO
pay to take greater account of the social component of bank losses.
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Our contribution is to merely point out that regulator incentives are
an overlooked but crucial factor affecting bank risk taking, and that
improving the social performance of banks and the banking system
requires a consideration of the incentives not only of bank CEOs
but also of bank regulators. Insofar as we can improve the efficiency of government regulators, we need to worry less about the
structure of private incentives, which are further from the control
of government.
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